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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in VLSI/WSI technology have led to the design of processor 
arrays with a large number of processing elements confined in small areas. The 
use of redundancy to increase fault-tolerance has the effect of reducing the ratio 
of area dedicated to processing elements over the area occupied by other resources 
in the array. The assumption of fault-free hardware support (switches, buses, 
interconnection links, etc.,), leads at best to conservative reliability estimates. 
However, detailed modeling entails not only an explosive growth in the model 
state space but also a difficult model construction process. To address the latter 
problem, a systematic method to construct Markov models for the reliability 
evaluation of processor arrays is proposed. This method is based on the premise 
that the fault behavior of a processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic Petri 
Net (SPN). However, in order to obtain a more compact representation, a set of 
attributes is associated with each transition in the Petri net model. This 
representation is referred to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) model. A 
MSPN allows the construction of the corresponding Markov model as the 
reachability graph is being generated. The Markov model generated can include 
the effect of failures of several different components of the array as well as the 
effect of a peculiar distribution of faults when the reconfiguration occurs. Specific 
reconfiguration schemes such as Successive Row Elimination (SRE), Alternate 
Row-Column Elimination (ARCE) and Direct Reconfiguration (DR), are analyzed
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8419745 and in part by the Innovative Science and Technology Office of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization and was administered through the Office of Naval Research under 
contracts No. 00014-85-k-0588 and No. 00014-88-k-0723.
2in detail. Randomization techniques are used to solve the inherently large models 
that can be generated via a MSPN representation. A model reduction technique 
based on the discrimination of states with low mean holding times is discussed. 
Finally, an analysis of hierarchical structures formed with variations of the 
schemes analyzed, is presented. The results reported in this work were obtained 
using MGRE (Model Generation and Reliability Evaluator) which is a software 





Recent advances in YLSI/WSI technology have led to the design of processor 
arrays with a large number of processing elements (PE’s) confined in small areas. 
At wafer level, the elimination of interchip connections and faster signal 
propagation due to shorter interconnections between PE’s results in higher 
processing speed. However, large densities and hardware Complexity increase the 
likelihood of faults during the fabrication process. In addition, a large number of 
active elements involved in a single computation cycle, increases the possibility of 
failures at any time during the operational life of the array. Increased likelihood 
of faults during the fabrication process results in low production yield whereas 
large number of active elements involved in the functional operation of the array, 
decreases reliability. Research efforts have been directed not only to yield 
improvement but also to increase fault-tolerance [KoB84,KoP87]. To increase 
both yield and reliability, several reconfiguration algorithms which use the 
available redundancy in the array have been proposed. In addition, fault 
detection and recovery upon the occurrence of faults is required during the 
fabrication process or the functional operation of the array. Because of their 
susceptibility to faults and the added hardware complexity on the overall array, 
components other than processing elements become very important In the analysis
4of fault-tolerant processor arrays. However, there is a tendency to limit the 
reliability analysis of processor arrays to failures of processing elements only 
[RaA84]. The assumption of fault-free support hardware in the form of switches, 
buses, interconnection links, etc., for the analysis of fault-tolerant processor 
arrays leads at best to conservative reliability estimations. The need to construct 
more general models is recognized in the mathematical framework derived by 
Koren et al [KoB84,KoP87,KoP86] to evaluate yield improvement and 
performance-related measures of different array architectures.
A number of analytic models and methods for the reliability analysis of fault 
tolerant computer systems currently exists [Tri85,GeT83,HiE83]. Combinatorial 
analysis and Markov models are the most common methods used to deyelop 
analytical models for the reliability analysis of fault tolerant systems. In the case 
of combinatorial methods, if the system can be divided into several modules, they 
are assumed independent (i.e. no faults or repair dependencies exist) and 
reliability estimations can be derived using fault trees and series-parallel 
structures for which definite mathematical tools exist [Tri82]. Markov models on 
the other hand offer the alternative of analyzing systems with interdependent 
components. A fault-tolerant processor array can be considered a system with 
interdependent components in the sense that the failure of one component may or 
may not affect other components of the array. The manner in which the 
components of the array are interdependent varies with the topology implemented 
and the reconfiguration algorithm that takes place when a faulty component is 
detected.
In this work the problem of evaluating the reliability of processor arrays 
using Markov models is addressed. However, a detailed modeling that takes into 
consideration failure interdependencies of several components, entails not only an
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explosive growth in the model state space but also a difficult model construction 
process. To address the latter problem, a systematic method to construct Markov 
models for the reliability evaluation of processor arrays is proposed. This method 
is based on the premise that the fault behavior of a processor array can be 
modeled by a Stochastic Petri Net (SPN). In order to achieve a complete mapping 
from places and transitions in an SPN-like representation of small size to states 
and transition rates in the Markov model, a modified version of SPN’s is 
proposed. However a more compact representation is obtained by associating a set 
of attributes with each transition in the Petri net. This representation is referred 
to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) model. The set of attributes 
includes a probability function such that the effect of faulty spares in the 
reconfiguration algorithm is captured each a time a configuration change occurs. 
This distribution includes the probabilities of survival given that a number of 
components required by the reconfiguration process is faulty. Depending on the 
type of component and the reconfiguration scheme, probabilities of survival can 
be determined using closed form expressions or via simulation. Reconfiguration 
schemes such as Successive Row Elimination (SRE) Alternate Row-Column 
Elimination (ARCE) [FoR85] and Direct Reconfiguration (DR) [SaS86a],[ SaS86b] 
are analyzed in detail using MSPN’s.
Once the Petri net model and the corresponding reachability graph have 
been obtained, all the information required to build the transition matrix of the 
corresponding Markov chain is available. At this stage, figures of merit such as 
reliability, performability, etc., can be readily addressed. Reliability evaluation 
tools such as ARIES [MaA82] and SHARPE [ShT86] can be used to evaluate the 
models developed here. However the use of these packages is limited to the 
evaluation of models with a relatively low number of states. To circumvent the 
problems involved in the numerical evaluation of large models, a software
6implementation based on the randomization procedure, has been used to generate 
the reliability results reported in this work. A software package (MGRE) has 
been developed [Lop89] to analyze fault-tolerant processor arrays based on the 
approach presented in this report. By the execution of appropriate commands, 
MGRE can generate Markov models, evaluate reliability and MTTF given the size 
of the processor array and a set of failure rates.
1.2. Overview
In the second chapter the main topic of this report is developed. A modified 
version of stochastic Petri nets is presented and its application is illustrated by 
the generation of a model corresponding to the SRE reconfiguration scheme. In 
the third chapter the ARCE and DR reconfiguration schemes are analyzed in 
detail. Also, expressions required to calculate probabilities of survival in the 
presence of faults, are derived. Results concerning the state space and reliability 
analysis of these schemes are also reported. The fourth chapter discusses software 
algorithms for the numerical evaluation of large Markov models. In chapter five, 
several hierarchical configurations are compared with respect to their MTTF and 
reliability performance.
CHAPTERH
MODIFIED STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS
2.1. Introduction
As is the case with many systems, Markov models can be used to evaluate 
the reliability of processor arrays. However, reliability estimations are mostly 
based only on the failures of processing elements [RaA84]. Components other 
than processing elements become very important in the analysis of fault-tolerant 
processor arrays because of their susceptibility to faults and the added hardware 
complexity of the overall array. This fact has played an important role in the 
derivation of a mathematical framework developed by Koren et al 
[KoB84,KoP86,KoP87] to evaluate yield improvement and performance-related 
measures of different array architectures. However, a detailed modeling of fault- 
tolerant processor arrays, which explicitly takes into consideration the failure 
statistics of each component as well as their possible interdependencies, entails 
not only an explosive growth in the model state space but also a difficult model 
construction process. Therefore, in this chapter the latter problem is emphasized 
and a systematic method to construct Markov models to evaluate the reliability of 
processor arrays is discussed. This method is based on the premise that the fault 
behavior of a processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) 
However, in order to obtain a more compact representation, a set of attributes is 
associated with each transition in the Petri net model. The resulting model is
8referred to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) representation. An MSPN 
representation allows the construction of the corresponding Markov model as the 
generation of the reachability graph takes place. Included in the set of attributes 
associated with each transition in a MSPN, is a discrete probability distribution 
such that the effect of faulty spares in the reconfiguration algorithm is captured 
each time a configuration change occurs. This distribution includes the 
probabilities of survival given that a number of components required by the 
reconfiguration process are faulty. Depending on the type of component and the 
reconfiguration scheme, probabilities of survival are determined using simulation 
or closed form expressions.
Once the Petri net model and the corresponding reachability graph have 
been obtained, all the information required to build the transition matrix of the 
corresponding Markov chain is available. At this stage, figures of merit such as 
reliability, performability, etc., can be readily addressed. Reliability evaluation 
tools such as ARIES [MaA82] and SHARPE [ShT86] can be used to evaluate the 
models developed here.
The second section of this chapter discusses some basic notation and 
concepts related to array configurations. An SPN representation is derived using 
as an example the SRE reconfiguration scheme. The third section of this chapter 
discusses Modified Stochastic ij’etri Nets (MSPN’s) and an MSPN representation 
for the SRE scheme is derived;j also a procedure to construct MSPN’s is outlined. 
In the fourth section, the correspondence between markings in an MSPN 
representation and the states in a Markov chain is described; a procedure to 
construct the reachability graph of a given MSPN is outlined.
i
92.2. Concepts and Notation
In this section a representation of array configurations using a SPN is 
discussed. For illustration, examples using the SRE reconfiguration scheme are 
presented.
2.2,1. Array Configurations
To analyze a fault-tolerant array architecture with k types of components, 
the configuration of an array is represented as a k-tuple:
C» = (*7it> %«> ,Vki) * = 0,1, * * * ,
where ?//,• denotes the number of elements of component type / and C is the set of 
all possible configurations of the array. Examples of component types include 
processing elements, links, switches, spare links and spare processing elements. 
The occurrence of faults and the application of the reconfiguration algorithm 
define a sequence of configurations that begins with C0 as the initial 
configuration; any other configuration can correspond to the failure state or an 
operational state of the array. The latter will be referred to as an operational 
configuration.
Upon detection of a faulty component, the reconfiguration algorithm may 
not send the array to an operational configuration if any of the following 
happens:
1) The reconfiguration circuitry failed. This possibility can be considered 
through a coverage factor (denoted by c) defined as the probability of 
successful reconfiguration given that a fault has occurred [BoC69|. This is a 
measure of the probability of successful operation of all circuitry related to 
fault detection, isolation and reconfiguration. The coverage factor is assumed 
constant and it will be associated with failures of active components only.
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2) Redundancy is exhausted. This information can be inferred from (7,-.
3) The presence of faults in non-active components (redundancy) hinders a 
successful reconfiguration. Redundant components are present in C*,- as spare 
processing elements, spare switches, spare links, spare buses, etc. Some of 
these components become active in the new configuration.
In a given configuration with a number of faulty components, successful 
reconfiguration will depend not only on the type of faults but also on their 
distribution in the array. Thus, the probability of correct reconfiguration in the 
presence of faults is referred to as the probability of survival [SaS86b]. Because 
the reconfiguration algorithm may choose one of several new configurations 
(including a non-operational one), a probability is assigned to each possible new 
configuration. The probability of survival corresponds to the sum of probabilities 
assigned to new operational configurations.
2.2.2. SPN Representation
While Markov models provide an analytical basis to derive reliability 
estimations of complex systems, their inherently large state space is difficult to 
construct and cannot be directly described in a convenient manner. On the other 
hand, SPN’s provide a succinct representation of the system and support a 
mechanized construction of the Markov model, because markings in an SPN 
correspond- bijectively to states in the Markov chain [Mol82]. In the case of 
fault-tolerant processor arrays, an operational configuration corresponds to an 
operational state in the Markov chain; thus, to derive all possible operational 
configurations of the array, a marking in the SPN must correspond to an 
operational configuration of the array. Each place p,- identifies components of type 
i and, at a given marking Mg, the number of tokens m,9 corresponds to which
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is the number of components of type ». Two or more distinct component types 
may identify the same physical component; for example, a physical spare is a 
component of the type "active spare" when it is used to replace a faulty part and 
it is a component of the type "non-active spare" otherwise.
Consider for example an »Xn array that supports the Successive-Row- 
Elimination (SRE) reconfiguration scheme with a layout as in Figure 2.1. The 
SRE scheme as presented in [FoR85], is based on the successive elimination of 
rows. Row elimination is done by using switches (S’s) and redundant links to 
bypass all processing elements (PE’s) of any row containing at least one faulty PE 
or at least one faulty horizontal link (HL) or at least one faulty input/output link 
(IOL); spare bypass links (SBL’s) become active bypass links (BL’s) which are used 
to bypass faulty rows; the array fails when rows are exhausted or if either one 
active bypass link or a switch fails. A marking q is described as:
Mq = (#PE,#IOL,#S,#BL,#HL,#SBL) = (mlq,m2q,m3q, . . . , m6f) 
where the symbol n=^M is used to denote "number of".
A possible SPN representation is given in Figure 2.2. The firing of t\, 
represents the occurrence of a fault in a PE, a fault in an IOL is represented by 
the firing of t2 and so on. In general, the firing of f,- represents a fault occurrence 
in a component of type i where 1<* <A; and k is the number of places and 
transitions. In SRE, component types 1 through 6 correspond to PE, IOL, S, BL, 
HL, SBL and A:—6, respectively.
A
Input and output places with respect to represent the effect of a fault on 
the corresponding components; i.e., each transition involves a set of I/O 
functions A,- — {/(£,), 0(i,)} and a set V,- of multiplicities fj, such that when A; 
fires in Mqr the number of tokens m/? in each place p/eA,- is modified as follows:




Figure 2.1. Schematic Layout of the SRE Structure
where m/y is the modified number of tokens in pi in a new marking My. If p,f = 0, 
Pi is only an input place and if A = 0, pi is only an output place. For example in 
Fig. 2.2, the failure of a PE (ti), affects the following components: PE’s, IOL’s, 
HL’s, SBL’s and BL’s; therefore, a set of input and output places with respect to 
i 1 is given as:
|
Al ={{pi,P2,P5,P&},{P4}}
Assuming an nXn processor array, the set of multiplicities associated with Ai is 
given as:
Vi— {A = n; A = 2n; A = » - 1; A — n; = n}.
If less than the number of spares required for reconfiguration are available, then 
the array fails to reconfigure and the resulting marking is characterized by the
fact that mg < 0. The negative value of m& can be used to identify a failure 
marking reached due to exhaustion of spares. Some schemes require that specific 
transitions be enabled or disabled depending on the current configuration and the 
reconfiguration algorithm. Assume for example, that not only rows but also 
columns are eliminated during the reconfiguration process. In these cases, each pi 
becomes a function of the current marking; e.g., //{ equals the number of columns 
in the current configuration. Hence, in order to include all possible cases, p/ must 
be regarded as a variable multiplicity (this concept is an extension of the usual 
notion of "multiplicities" in Petri Net theory).
Although the SPN in Fig. 2.2, might provide the number of operational 
configurations required, it fails to consider the cases when enough spares are 
available but reconfiguration cannot take place (due for example to a peculiar 
distribution of faults). As a consequence, this approach might provide overly 
optimistic reliability estimates. Conceivably, a different SPN model can be used to 
accurately represent the dependency of successful reconfiguration on fault 
distributions. However, such an SPN would itself consist of a very large number 
of places and transitions which increases with the size of the array. One of the 
intents in this chapter is to provide an extension of the SPN concept so that 
dependence on fault-distribution can be accounted for in a model with a 
complexity comparable to that of Figure 2.2 regardless of the size of the array 
and reconfiguration scheme used.
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2.3. MSPN Representation
The fact that several types of faults affect the array in the same manner, 
suggests the possibility of a more compact SPN-like representation, which is 





Figure 2.2. SPN of the SRE Scheme
distributions by associating with each transition i,-, a set of attributes described as 
follows:
t{: <P{x | Mq, £,•), Si(Mq), B{t c{>
where:
P(x | Mq, tf) defines a discrete probability function where x represents a 
random marking My in a set R directly reachable from a particular marking 
Mq; the notation Pr'qj is used to denote the probability of reconfiguration 
P(x — Mj | Mq, ti), i.e., the probability that the net is in marking My after f,- 
fires when the net is in marking Mq. The advantage of assigning a 
probability function to each transition f,-, is the ability to determine correct 
transition rates between states in the corresponding Markov model as the 
reachability graph is being generated. Thus, when fires, one value of the 
probability function is assigned to the marking generated, another value is
15
assigned to another marking that can be generated by the immediate firing 
of a possibly different transition and so on. This sequence of firings is 
dictated by the current marking and the reconfiguration scheme modeled. 
Notice that the markings generated could have been generated previously 
and the probabilities of reconfiguration are only used to modify the 
transition rates;
Si(Mq) is a sequence of transitions that will fire immediately after i,- fires. If 
no immediate firing is required then Si(Mq) is a null sequence. Depending on 
the reconfiguration scheme, 5,- can be unique for all markings or is 
determined in terms of Mq;
Bi is a Binary Transition Vector with k elements 6/ such that, 6/ = 1 if the 
failure of the Ith component triggers the transition ft* and 6/ = 0 otherwise. 
This vector is used to identify those components that can trigger the 
corresponding transition £t-; it facilitates the merging of non-distinct 
markings, the derivation of probability transition vectors (defined in section 
2.4) and the derivation of flags (i.e., failure rate conditions) that signal a 
^possible non-occurrence of a transition;
The term is a coverage factor associated with £,*, such that if £t- is triggered 
by the failure of a spare (inactive) component then c,- = 1; thus, the 
possibility of array failure at the time that one of these components fails is 
non-existent; if £,• is triggered by the failure of an active component then ct* 
corresponds to the probability of detection given that a fault occurs (i.e.,
c, < !).
To illustrate the set of transition attributes just discussed, consider the SRE
A A A
scheme in Fig. 2.1 and the SPN of Fig. 2.2. Since and £5, have the same
. . 16-
effect on the array, a single transition ty is defined in a MSPN with a vector 
By — [110 0 1 0] to indicate that either the failure of a PE, IOL or a HL, can
A A
cause ty to fire. Likewise, t3 and f4 become t2 with a vector B2 = [00 1 1 0 0]. 
The firing of t2 represents the failure of a BL or a S either of which is fatal. 
Transition fg becomes t2 and represents the failure of a SBL with a vector 
#3 =[00000 1].
Consider now the case when a given operational configuration contains faulty 
SBL’s. The probability that none of them lies in the row that is eliminated when 
ty fires, corresponds to the probability of reconfiguration Pr\j. If at least one 
SBL is faulty in the row deleted, the array fails to reconfigure with a probability 
PrXgj = 1—Prlqj (the failure marking is denoted as Mf). In general, probabilities of 
reconfiguration are complicated functions of the characteristics of each 
reconfiguration scheme (e.g., replacement rules, hardware requirements, 
dependencies on fault distributions, etc.) and the size and shape of the array. 
They must be derived for each scheme and in some cases extensive simulation is 
required due to the complexity of the combinatorial analysis involved. Examples 
where suitable expressions can be derived include SRE, ARCE and DR. Since 
different markings may correspond to different number of SBL’s, Pr\j is a 
function of the current marking (i.e., Mq). Let Ps denote the probability of 
survival, then for SRE, Ps = Prjy and can be estimated via equation (3.8) or (3.9) 
which are derived in chapter 3 in terms of the number AT of faulty SBL’s, present 
in the current marking Mq. Some transitions in a MSPN will exhibit a dual 
nature: they can be fired exponentially or immediatedly; once a transition fires 
exponentially, a sequence of immediate firings (specified by 5,) of possibly 
different transitions may follow. Therefore, in SRE, when ty fires exponentially, 
t2 will fire immediately to generate a failure marking and Sy = (t2). This follows 
from the fact that when ty fires, the required SBL’s become BL’s and if one of
17
them is faulty 12 fires immediately. When i2 or ^3 fire exponentially no 
immediate sequence is required and 52 and £3 are null sequences. It will be seen 
that in some applications such as ARCE, the sequence of immediate firings is not 
unique as it is selected depending on the current marking.
Bl = [110010], B2 = [001100], j93 = [000001] 
Pr2qj =Pr\j=l,c<A,Pr\j=Ps as given in Ch. 3
Figure 2.3. MSPN of the SRE scheme
Considering the coverage factors, the sets of attributes associated with the 
transitions in the MSPN of the SRE scheme, are summarized in Figure 2.3.
2.3.1. I/O Places and Variable Multiplicities
Associated with each tj in the MSPN there is a set of I/O places 
Aj = 0(£,)} and a set of multiplicities:
V*i={ri,njl\pie{l{ti)},pke{0(ti)}}
Two transitions in the SPN, can have the same set of I/O places and 
different set of multiplicities; i.e. two distinct faults may affect the same 
components in different ways. In order for distinct transitions in the SPN to be
18
merged in a single transition in the MSPN, they must have the same set of I/O 
places and the same set of multiplicities. Because a coverage factor is associated 
with each transition in the MSPN, components whose failures fire a given 
transition must all correspond to either active or non-active components only (i.e., 
components of both types can not be present).
Example 2.1: Consider the SPN in Fig. 2.2. The failure of a PE (<i), the 
failure of a IOL (£2) or the failure of an HL (£5) affect the same components of 
the array and the set of multiplicities for each set of arcs is the same; therefore 
transitions £1} £2 and £5 can be merged into a single transition such that
^1= { 0(^)1 = Ax = A2 = As = {{pi,p2,P5,P&}, {P4}}
and
V[ = Vx = V2 = V5 = {/if = n; i4 = 2n; [x{ = n- 1; A = n; A = n}. 
Likewise, A3 = A4; i.e., the failure of either a S or a BL (£3 or £4) causes the 
array to fail affecting all components in the same way; i.e., transitions £3 and £4 
can be merged into a single transition t2 such that
A2 = {/(i2), 0(t2)} = {{p 1 j P 2 > P 3 >P 45P5>P6}> 0} 
and a set of multiplicities
Vg=V3 = V4= {/if = H=PEq; A = #JO/g; A =.#5g; /if = #BLq] A =
/4 = #S£L9};
Finally, we have that the failure of a SBL (ig) affects only SBL’s; i.e.,
A3 - {/(i3)» 0(^)} = ^6 = {{Pe}, {0}} with V3 = V6 = {/i6 = 1} 
where £3 in the MSPN replaces Iq. □.
In summary, an MSPN model is an extension of a SPN with the purpose of 
representing fault-tolerant processor arrays and can be defined as follows:
MSPN = (P, T, A, M, Pr, Sq, B, Cv)
where Pr is a set of probability functions P(x \Mq,t{) associated to transitions 
T; Sq is a set of sequences 5t- of of transitions that fire immediately after an 
exponential firing of t^T; B is the set of binary transition vectors Bi defined for 
each ij-eT; Cv is the set of coverage constants c,- associated with each t,eT.
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2.3.2. MSPN Construction
Given a processor array and a reconfiguration scheme, an informal procedure 




Initial configuration Cq = (??i % * ' ' Vk)i
Set of rules that determine the actions of the reconfiguration algorithm in 
response to faults; i.e., a rule r,-; specifies the type and number of components 
added or subtracted if a component type i fails in an operational 
configuration Cp,
Coverage factors for the failures of both active and non-active components;
Tables of probabilities of reconfiguration for each non-active component 
type. (For each different non-active component type, a probability of 
successful reconfiguration is conditioned by the number of faults of each 
type; the probability of configuration is then the product of these conditional 
probabilities).
Output: MSPN representation: (P, T, A, M, Pr, Sq, B, Cv)
Begin
Step 1:
Assign a place p,- and a transition i,- to component type i.
Step 2:
for each rule r,-; do
20
Group the component types affected by the failure of component type i 
into a set A* as the set of I/O places with respect to transition
Determine the multiplicity of each peA,- and let V,- be the set of 




Group those transition t,- that: a) are fired by components which are all of 
type active or all of type non-active b) have the same set of input and output 
places c) have the same set of multiplicities and d) have same coverage 
factor.
For each group i do
Define transition tj, sets At- and F,-.
Specify
Form the binary transition vector B{ such that a component b\ of J3t- is 
one if the failure of a component type 1 can fire and zero otherwise.
end for 
end procedure
As pointed out previously a discrete probability distribution is associated 
with each transition such that a number of faulty spare components present in 
the current configuration is taken into account when the firing occurs. These 
probabilities are estimated using simulation or by closed form expressions.
2.4. Reachability Graph
In this section the generation of the reachability graph is discussed. A 
mapping from the transitions in the MSPN to the transitions between states in 
the corresponding Markov model is established. An implementation procedure to 
generate the reachability graph is also described.
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2.4.1. Probability Transition Vectors
For each marking MqjtR generated when i,- fires (as stated previously R is 
the set of markings that can be directly generated from the same marking Mq), Bt- 
and the distribution function P(x \ Mq,ti) defined previously can be used to 
generate vectors of the form:
Pr'qjBi = [prx • • • prk\
where pn — Prqj if 6/ = 1 and pr\ = 0 if 6/ = 0. These vectors are referred to as 
the Probability Transition Vectors (PTV’s). The use of PTV’s is illustrated in
Fig. 2.4; assuming y=l,2,..., | R \ identifies the markings that can be directly
\R\ ■
generated from the same marking Mq, then Prq}- — 1. In the event that two
1=1
or more non-distinct new markings are generated from the same marking, a 
merging to a single new marking is carried out by a vector addition of the 
corresponding probability transition vectors.
Figure 2.4.- Marking Generation with Pr‘qj
Example 2.2: Analyzing a particular marking (in a 4X4 array with a MSPN 
as in Figure 2.3) say M18 r- [12 24 20 4 9 11], then if tl fires (i.e. either a PE, a
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IOL or a HL failed) the marking M^o = [8 16 20 8 6 7] results with
Pr}8)3o = 0.667. Thus, a PTV is given by Pr}8)30JBi = [0.667 0.667 0 0 0.667 0].
However the array may fail with Pr\Q j = 0.333 due to the existence of one faulty
SBL (#PE’s - #SBL’s — 12 - 11 — 1). Thus, a PTV is given by
PrlsjBi = [0-333 0.333 0 0 0.333 0]
When t2 fires (i.e a S' or a BL failed), the array fails with probability Prfgy = 1, 
the corresponding PTV is given by: Prl8jB2 =[00 1 1 0 0]. Therefore, the 
overall PTV associated with the transition to the failure marking when t\ or t2 
fires is obtained as follows: Pr\8jBi + Pr\&jB2 = [0.333 0.333 1 1 0.333 0]. The 
probability of survival is obtained by applying equation (3.9) derived in chapter 3. 
□.
2.4.2. Failure Rate Condition
Any transition in the MSPN can fire on every possible marking that 
represents an operational configuration. However, if all components whose failures 
fire a particular transition never fail, that transition will never fire. In the process 
of generating the reachability graph, a flag st- signals this condition for each 
transition i,-. Let a be a vector with components a; where each cq is the failure 
rate of the component type l and a;,- = B^. The flag s,- is set to one if a,- > 0 and 
zero otherwise.
2.4.3. Derivation of Transition Rates
Let (X(t), f >0} denote a continuous time homogeneous Markov process on a 
finite state space S ^ {l,2, * • • ,s) and denote the state probability vector at 
time t by P(t) — [Pi(<), P2(0> ' ‘ * > Ps(t)], where Pi(t) = P{X{t)=i}, ieS. The 
process is characterized by the following set of Chapman-Kolmogorov differential
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equations:
dPAt) , , ■
I, " = XIaijPi{t) ~~ aj}Pj{t)
al i
where a,-y are the transition rates from previous states i and ayy = Yjajh "where ay*
k
are transitions rates from state j to states k. The solution for the set of 
differential equations is given in matrix form as follows:
P(t) = P(0)eAt
where A is the transition rate matrix with elements a,y and P(0) — (1,0, • * • ,0)f 
is the initial vector state. Assuming there is only one absorbing state (i.e., failure 
state) and indexing transient (operational) states by l,...,s—1, then the reliability
S
of the system is given by: R (t) — Pi{i)
The transition rates a,y can be expressed in terms of the attributes associated 
with the transitions in the MSPN, i.e., aqx = f (P{x \
Denote by a a diagonal transition rate matrix with elements ay,- = ay and
a
atj-y = 0 for i=£j (a,- is the failure rate of the ith component). Let Mq — Mqa where 
Mq = [mlg, m2g, * • • ra^q] denotes as before, a particular marking q, then
Qqi — fy^,CjPrq\bj) b,eBi,j=l,...,k]Mg (2.1)
i
defines the transition rate from state q to an operational state /. The summation
is defined over all transitions that fire exponentially and generate the same
marking l. It is interesting to notice the relationship of equation (2.1) with the
- T
firing rate of a particular transition <,• given by the vector product B(Mq . A 
transition to the failure state occurs for lack of support (i.e., enough spares) or 
lack of coverage. In the first case, lack of support occurs if the reconfiguration 
algorithm failed due to exhaustion of spare components or the fact that the array
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fails to reconfigure if a given distribution of faults is not supported by tbe 
reconfiguration algorithm. Denote by the transition to the failure state (f) for 
lack of support, then
• 'A ' ' '
X<jf = fy)Prqfbji
Let \cqf be the transition to / for lack of coverage then:
/ »
The overall transition rate to the failure state is:
Kf = V + ^9/
The diagonal term of the matrix A is calculated as follows:
aqg=~( E aql + ^gf) = _(EV + V)
where:
i
Example 2.8: Consider a particular marking say Mjg = [12 24 20 4 9 11], then
with the following failure rates: aQ = 1, ax = a2 == * * * = .01, yield
M18 = [12 .24 .20 .04 .09 ,11]. As in example 2.2, the following probabilities are
used: Prig,30 = 0.667, Pr\8j = 0.333, Prf8j — 1. Let cx — c2 = c then, when tx
fires the following transition rates in the Markov chain are generated:
* T
ais,f = c[.667 .667 0 0 .667 0]M18 = 8.2241c. The transition to the failure state 
due to lack of support when t\ and i2 fire is
X18)/ = ([.333 .333 0 0 .333 0]+[0 0 11 0 0]J.M18 = 4.34589. For lack of coverage
A
X^ = (1—c)[.667 .667 0 0 .667 0]M4 = 8.2241(1—c). The overall transition rate 
to the failure state is given as X18y = 8.2241 *(1—c) + 4.34589. Considering that a
failure of a SBL (£0) yields a transition rate a18ig = [00000 1]M18 0.11 then
the diagonal term is calculated as: a j8 i8 = 8.2241+.11+4.34589 — 12.68. □
2.4.4. Implementation Procedure
The implementation procedure MODELGEN outlined below merges repeated 
markings as they are being generated and calculates or modifies the transition 
rates in the process. The new markings generated every iteration, are targets of 
the currently visited marking; they are inserted into a linked list of markings. As 
they are generated, markings are sorted with respect to the sum of those 
components indicated by the user through comparison flags previously set. An 
array of pointers to the newly created targets is updated. A pointer to the current 
marking is denoted by cm. A pointer to the next marking in the list is referred to 
by next A systematic indexing of markings is carried out such that the resulting 
transition rate matrix is always upper triangular; a marking number is assigned 
to every next marking fetched from the sorted list; a pointer nxtopr points to 
markings Which are candidates to be printed or saved in a file. If all its targets 
have been numbered, then a marking is saved or printed out; therefore, no 
significant amount of memory is required to generate large models. The 
procedure stops when all markings have been fetched from the sorted list. Notice 
that the linked list corresponds to the reachability graph and as it is forme(d, both 
the transition rate matrix representation of the Markov model and the 
reachability graph are printed out or saved as requested by the user.
Procedure MODELGEN -
Inputs: Set of failure rates (a,); File names (to save the matrix representation 
of the Markov model); An MSPN representation of the reconfiguration 
algorithm (Procedure MSPN outlined previously).
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Outputs: Reachability graph description; Matrix representation of the 
Markov model.
Begin
Set a coverage flag for each transition that it is fired by non-active 
components, (this allows the evaluation of a symbolic matrix for different 
coverage values).
Set comparison flags (to select those components by which the list of 
markings is sorted).
Load initial marking 
for each t,-let s,-=
Let cm point to initial marking 
nxtopr — cm 
while not end of list do 
fetch current marking 
assign a number to current marking 
for each £,• and if st- > 0 do 
get P(x | Mq,ti)
fire ti and those transitions fye5,- 
calculate transition rates 
store targets in temporary table 
end for
merge repeated targets 
insert new targets in sorted list 
insert pointers to new targets in current marking 
while all targets of nxtopr are numbered do 
output nxtopr marking 
let nxtopr = nxtopr^-next 
end while 
let cm = cm—>next 
end while 
end procedure
The execution time of MODELGEN is proportional to the number of states 
generated and therefore depends on the reconfiguration algorithm. For the cases




A systematic procedure to construct Markov models was discussed in this 
chapter. Using an SPN-like representation, transition firing represents the 
occurrence of faults; A place contains a number of tokens tokens which 
correspond to the number of components of a single type; thus, the collection of 
different components is represented by a marking in an SPN-like representation 
and a marking corresponds to an operational configuration of the array. However 
an SPN-like representation fails to take into account the distribution of faulty 
spares that exist when reconfiguration takes place and may cause the array to 
fail. Also the fact that several component types causes the same effect in the 
array when it reconfigures, leads to a more compact representation of the array 
which is referred to as an MSP N representation.
A mapping from transitions and markings in an MSPN representation to 
transitions and states in the Markov model was derived. This mapping allows the 
construction of the corresponding Markov model as the generation of the 
reachability graph is taking place.
The more the detail (number of components or places in the MSPN 
representation) that is included in the model the larger is the state space in the 
resulting Markov model. In summary the application of this method entails two 
interrelated problems. In the first place a thorough analysis of the array is 
required such that all interdependencies of failures of different components are 
defined; this can be a difficult task for complex reconfiguration schemes; secondly, 
in some applications a detailed modeling may be limited to small size arrays
28
because of the large number of states generated. Finally, considering the fact that 
reconfiguration algorithms are primarily designed to treat failures of PE’s 
elements only, an MSPN representation for a given reconfiguration scheme, will 
depend on the assumptions made as to how the algorithm treats failures on 





In this chapter three reconfiguration schemes are analyzed in detail. 
Algorithms to calculate probabilities of reconfiguration are derived. As stated in 
the previous chapter, probability functions P(x | are associated with each
transition i,- in the MSPN; probabilities of reconfiguration are used to determine 
Probability Transition Vectors which are in turn used to calculate transition rates 
in the Markov model. The probability of survival corresponds to the sum of 
probabilities of reconfiguration if the new markings generated are all operational; 
i.e. if the new markings correspond to operational configurations. In the second 
section of this chapter two algorithms are derived to calculate probabilities of 
reconfiguration for the SRE scheme. The third and fourth sections deal in detail 
with the ARCE and DR reconfiguration schemes, respectively. Expressions to 
determine the number of states for each reconfiguration scheme are given in 
section five. Also, in this section, results of the reliability analysis of each scheme 
are reported.
30
3.2. SRE Reconfiguration Scheme
In chapter 2, the basic concepts underlining MSPN’s representations of fault 
tolerant processor arrays were thoroughly discussed. Concurrently and for the 
purpose of illustration, the SRE reconfiguration scheme was analyzed. Hence, in 
this section, expressions to estimate probabilities of reconfiguration for this 
scheme are derived.
The process of generating the reachability graph which describes the 
corresponding Markov model of an SRE scheme, starts with an initial marking 
given as follows: 
p1:#PE = n2 
p2:#IOL=2n2 
P3: #S = n+n2 
Pa-. = 0 
p5: f-IIL = n(n-l) 
p6:#SBL = n2
A failure marking corresponds to the case when $PE=0 or $SBL<i0. 
Transition tl will take place if either alf a2 or a5 is greater than zero; t2 will 
take place if either a3 or a4 is greater than zero. Likewise, t3 takes place if 
a5>0.
3.2.1. Probability Transition Vectors in SRE
To derive PTV’s, estimations of probabilities of reconfiguration are required 
for each reconfiguration scheme. In the SRE case, its MSPN indicates (Fig. 3) 
that when tx fires, two transitions in the Markov model may occur (corresponding 
to a sequence of two firings in the MSPN: t\ followed by t2)] one with probability
Pr\j which corresponds to the probability of survival denoted by Ps. The other 
transition fires immediately and will lead the processor array to a failure state 
with probability Pr\f. The array will survive with probability Ps if the failure of a 
PE or an IOL that triggers the reconfiguration algorithm occurs in a row that 
contains no faulty SBL. Let N denote the number of faulty SBL in a marking Mq 
then N is determined by:
N = #PEq - #SBLq = mlq - m6f
where 0 < N < nX.ii.
To estimate Ps, it is necessary to find all the possible ways in which N faulty 
SBL’s can be mapped into a total of rXc SBL’s in the array with a current 
configuration containing r rows and c columns. To simplify this problem we count 
all the possible partitions of N into r parts with a value not greater than c 
columns. Because each row contains c SBL’s, up to c faulty SBL’s per row are 
possible.
Each partition of Nis a k-tuple (ai,o2, . . . , a*), such that:
N = Oij + "b ••• "b (3-1)
where: c>a,->c,+i>l for 1 and
In [Ber8l] it is shown that the number of partitions of N with k or less parts 
and AT>a,>a,+1>l, is given by the recurrence relations:
F(N-k,k)=F{N,l) + F(N,2)+ ... +F{N,k) (3.2)
F(N, 1) = F{N,N) = 1
The function F(N,k) is interpreted as the number of partitions of N with k
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Theorem 1: Let us denote by F(N) the number of wanted partitions of TV; 
i.e. those partitions with at least one part a,- > c are excluded. Then F(N) is 
given by:








F{N, c, 1) = F{N,c,N) = 1 if JV < c (3.5)
F{N,c,k) =0 if k> N (3.6)
Proof: Let us consider first the case when N > kc. Each term in the summation 
is recursively decomposed until the functions generated satisfy equations (3.5) and 
(3.6). The value of / in each term of the summation corresponds to a part a,- in 
the ith iteration. The partitions generated will contain a part a,- such that
< a,i < c. Hence, if N/k > c implies all partitions will have at least the 
first part aj >c and F(N,c,k) = 0 follows.
Let us examine now the case when N < ck. F(N,c,k) is decomposed into 
+1) functions, which in turn are recursively decomposed until the
cases of equations (3.5) or (3.6) are reached. In the process those functions in 
which N > kc or k > N are eliminated.
The number of terms in the sum corresponds to all the possible values a part may 
take and since the minimum at every iteration is a, = jiV/kj, we let ax < c as an 
upper bound for the first iteration which gives the number of summands
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indicated previously. For the next iteration the process is repeated. At the ith 
iteration, N = N—a{ and k has been decremented to indicate that now the new
value of N is to be partitioned in A;—* parts such
Equations (3.3-S.6) can also be used to determine the value of each part in a 
particular partition since in the ith iteration the index l in equation (3.4) 
corresponds to the value of a,- whereas N—l c< >
be partitioned among the k— 1 remaining part
Example S.l: To illustrate the application of the above relations, let us find 
all the possible distributions of 8 faulty SBL’s in a 4X4 array (r=c=n).
Solution: With N = 8, n — 4 and r = 4 we have:
F(8) = F(8,4,l) + F(8,4,2) + F(8,4,3) + F(8,4,4)
F (8,4,1) = 0 since 8 >4 
F(8,4,2)=F(4,4,1) = 1 
F(8,4,3)=F(5,3,2)+F(4,4,2)
= F(2,3,l) +F(2,2,1) +F(1,3,1) + F (0,4,1) = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 
F(8,4,4) = F(6,2,3) + F(5,3,3) + F(4,4,3)
=>(4,2,2).+ F (3,2,2) +> (2,3,2) + F(2,2,2) +F(l,3,2) +F(0,4,2) 
= F (2,2,1) + F (1,2,1) + F (1,1,1) +F (1,1,1) +0+0=4 
And F(8) = 0 + 1+3+ 4= 8
given by F(8,4,2); partitions 2-4 are given by F(8,4,3); and partitions 5-8 are given 
by F(8,4,4). □
Table 3.1, shows the order of the resulting partitions, where partition 1) is
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CL 9 a, % 04.'
1 4 4 0 0
2 3 3 2 0
3 4 2 2 0
4 4 3 1 0
5 . 2 2 2 2
6 3 2 2 1
7 3 3 1 1
8 4 2 1 1
The probability of survival Ps can be found by two methods using in both 





The term P(s | i) is the probability of success given the ith partition occurs and 
P(») is the probability that the ith partition occurs. These probabilities are 
obtained as follows:
p(5io = 4 >(o = f
where Z{ is the number of zeros in the ith partition, 7T,- = • * Tr
r—1n
t=0
corresponds to the number of mappings represented by the ith partition with m
F(N)






number of possible mappings of N faulty SBL’s into an array with rXc number of 
PE’s. After some manipulations on equation (3.7), the following expression 
results:





A drawback in this procedure is that an enumeration of the possible partitions of 
N is required and this is a lengthy task for large processor arrays. A second 
method more attractive for large arrays is given in the following:
Theorem 8.2: Denote by k the number of rows (number of parts in the partition) 
with » faults (k parts with same value i), let 7r be defined as above and let #(&,*) 
be the total number of mappings with exactly k rows with i faults then the 












/ \ / \
r (r-j)c c
3 N-ij i< ■>
where 0 < t < c and m is determined such that 0 < N—im < (r— m)c.
Proof: To find 9(k, i), denote by A* the number of mappings with at least k rows 











The first binomial corresponds to the number of ways k is combined in r rows; the 
second binomial gives the number of mappings of the remaining faults into the 
remaining spots (PE’s) in the array; the last binomial corresponds to the number 
of ways in which i faults are mapped into c PE’s in one column in each of the k
rows. Because counts also A/ for 4</<m by a factor of 6(k, i) can be





By letting 6(m,i) = Am an expression of 8(k, *) is obtained recursively in terms of 
A*. After substituting A* the expression for 6{k, i) given above follows.
To obtain Ps, let a*jt- be the set of partitions with k rows with i faults then the 
probability of survival given a^i is k/r and using the Total Probability Theorem 




where P(a*t) = ^ —- and equation (3.9) follows. □
In the particular case of the SRE scheme, Ps is obtained by letting i=0 in 
equation (3.9).
3.3. ARCE Reconfiguration Scheme
In the ARCE scheme, a row elimination is followed by a column elimination 
[FoR85]. Figure 3.1, shows a section of an nXn array supporting ARCE. Since the 
number of rows and columns varies with each configuration, then at a given 
configuration, r denotes the number of rows and c the number of columns. The 
array is in a r-configuration (r=c) if the reconfiguration algorithm deletes a row; 
Likewise, it is in a c-configuration (r < c) if the reconfiguration algorithm deletes 
a column; In Figure 3.1, the following components are identified: PE’s; I/O 
Links, which are the interconnections between switches and PE’s; Column 
Switches (CS), which are the switches in the current c columns of the array; Row 
Switches (RS), these are the switches in the current r rows of the array. The spare 
bypass links (SBL) used to bypass a faulty row become active links and are 
referred to as Row Bypass Links (RBL’s). Likewise, the spare bypass links used 
to bypass a faulty column become active links and are referred to as Column 
Bypass Links (CBL’s).
In the case of ARCE, the following assumptions are made:
1) The failure of a PE or an IOL, causes the elimination of a row if the array is 
in a r-configuration; it causes the elimination of a column if it is in a c- 
configuration.
2) All switches in the current configuration are considered active.
3) The failure of a RS in a r-configuration, causes the elimination of that row; 
in a c-configuration, a column is eliminated followed by the affected row to 
comply with the alternate column-row deletion process.
4) The failure of a CS in a c-configuration, causes the deletion of the affected 
column; in a r-configuration a row and the affected column are eliminated.
5) The failure of a RBL, causes the same effect as the failure of a RS.
6) The failure of a CBL, causes the same effect as the failure of a CS.
7) If a row is deleted, the spare bypass links used to bypass that row must be 
fault free. Otherwise, the row is deleted followed by the column deletion with 
the faulty spare link; this sequence is referred to as a row-column deletion 
sequence. Likewise, if a column is deleted the spare bypass links used to 
bypass that column must be fault free; otherwise, the column is deleted 
followed by the row with the faulty spare link; this sequence is referred to as 
column-row deletion sequence.
3.3.1. MSPN Representation of the ARCE Scheme
Any operational configuration Ct- for the ARCE scheme is described as
follows:
Vi = (vu,V2i, V7i) - {#PE,#IOL,#C5,#RS,#RBL, f-CDL,#SBL)
An operational configuration Ct- corresponds to an operational marking M,-.
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Figure 3.1.- Schematic Layout of the ARCE Structure
An initial configuration C0 in terms of the size n of the array, is given by the 
following set of equations:
p1:#PE = n2, 
p2: #IOL = An2,
Pz‘ HRS = (n+l)w,
Pa' #<7S = (n+l)n, 
p5: #RBL = 0, 
p6: #CBL =0, 
p7: jjSBL = 2n2.
In any configuration <7,- described by a marking M,-, the number of rows r 
and columns c are calculated as follows:
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r (mi.)
The difference d = c — r — 0 identifies r-configurations and d — 1 identifies 
c-configurations.
'A transition to a failure marking occurs if the current marking contains not 
enough PE’s or not enough SBL’s. To identify this condition in each marking Mq, 
a flag x is set or reset accordingly:
1 if m{>m and m6>2m
x = i
0 otherwise
where m and 2m refer to the number of PE’s and SBL’s, respectively, eliminated 
by the reconfiguration scheme. Notice that m takes values depending on the type 
of the current configuration.
A place Pi and a transition £,• is assigned to each component type as listed 
above. For each f,- the corresponding set A,- of I/O places and set of multiplicities 
V{ are determined next.
According to assumption l), (failure of a PE) affects all the components in 
a column or a row; hence:
^1 = {/(<lj*0(|i)}. = {{Pl,P2»P3>P4,P5>P6,P7}>{P6>P7}}
The set Vi of variable multiplicities is given by the following set of 
equations:
a) n[ = rx+mlq(l— x)
b) jxl = 4rx+m2g(l— a:)
c) ni = {n+l)dx+mZq{l—x)
d) p,{ = (n+l)(l — d)x+m4g(l— x)
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e) p{ = (n—r)dx+m5q(l—x)
f) vl■— (»— c)(l — d)x+m6g(l— x)
g) p\ = 2rx+m7q(l-x)
h) p° = r(l-d)x-m5q(l-x)
i) P° = rdx—m6q(l—x)
This set of equations indicate that when fq fires then: a) r PE’s are deleted; 
b) 4 IOL’s for each PE eliminated are also eliminated; c) in a c-configuration, 
n+1 CS’s are deleted; d) in a r-configuration n+1 RS’s are deleted; e) n—r RBL’s 
are deleted in a r-configuration; this number corresponds to the RBL’s bypassing 
the PE’s in the rows already eliminated; however, no RBL’s are deleted if the 
current configuration is a c-configuration; f) no CBL’s are deleted in a c- 
configuration but in a r-configuration, n—c CBL’s need to be deleted which are 
those CBL’s bypassing PE’s in the columns already eliminated; g) since there are 
two SBL’s for each PE, 2r SBL’s are deleted in either configuration; h) the 
number of RBL added corresponds to the number of PE’s in a deleted row; i) the 
number of CBL’s added corresponds to the number of PE’s in a deleted column.
The failure of an IOL (f2)> as stated in assumption l) causes the same effect 
as fj. Therefore A % — A i and V2 — Flv
The failure of a CS (t3) as stated in assumption 4), will have the following 
set A3:
A3={l{i3),0(i3)} = {{p1,p2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7},{P5,P<i}}
Let m=r+(c—l)(l—d) then the set V3 of variable multiplicities is given as 
follows:
a) p[ = mx+mlq(l—x)
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b) *4 — 4fnx+m2?(l-s)
c) Pz = (n+l)x+W3?(l—x\
d) pi = (n-t-l)(l—d)x+m4q(l-x)
e) P5 =" (n-r)i+m5!(l-i)
D pi = (n—c)(l—d)a:-|-m6?(l-x)
g) P'7 = 2mx-\-m-jq{l—x)
b) = (c —1)(1—d)x—m5g(l--x)
0 p6 — (r+d— l)x—m6q(l—x)
Thus when t3 fires, equation a) shows that in a c-configuration, only r PE’s 
are eliminated; however in a row configuration, to delete a column a row must be 
deleted first giving a total of r+(c—1) PE’s eliminated. In general given a r- 
configuration, to delete a column, the sequence row-column deletion applies and 
given a c-configuration, to delete a row, the sequence column-row deletion applies. 
In equation b), for every PE that is eliminated 4 IOL’s are also eliminated. In c) 
shows that in either configuration, all the OS’s in the affected column are
eliminated. Equation d) shows that in a r-configuration all the RS’s in the affected 
row are eliminated. Equation e) indicates that in either configuration (n — r) 
RBL’s are eliminated. Equation f) shows that in a c-configuration, n—c is the 
number of rows that have been eliminated, so the same number of active CBL’s is 
eliminated. However none are eliminated if a column is deleted. Equation g) 
deletes 2 SBL’s for each PE deleted. Equation h) shows that in a c-configuration 
the row-column sequence activates only c— 1 RBL’s; none is activated in a r- 
configuration. Equations) shows that r—1 CBL’s are activated corresponding to 
the column deleted in a row-column sequence that applies in a c-configuration; in 
a r-configuration only a column is eliminated and so are the r CBL’s in it.
The effect of the failure of a RS (t4), as stated in assumption 3), is described 
by the following set A4:
A4={l{i4),0(t4)} = {{p1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7},{PS’P&}}
with the following set of variable multiplicities V4 where m—r+(c—i)d:
a) ,u{ — mx+mlq(l— x)
b) (ii2 = 4mi+m2g(l-i)
c) (n+l)dx+m3q(l—x)
d) /4 — {n+l)x+m4q(l—x)
e) /4 = (n—r)dx+m5q(l—x)
f) (Ug = (n—c)x+meq(l—x)
g) fly = 2mx+m,Tq(l—x)
h) /if = mx—mSq(l—x)
i) P'6 = {r~ l)dx—m6?(l—x)
These equations are essentially the same as for t^, except that in case of a c- 
configuration, the failure of a RS, implies the deletion of the affected row 
therefore the sequence column-row deletion applies. Note that equation h) shows 
that the number of CBL’s activated corresponds to the number of PE’s 
eliminated in a c-configuration; i.e. c CBL’s; in the case of a r-configuration 
r=c— 1 CBL’s are activated. Likewise, the number of RBL’s activated by 
equation i), corresponds to the number of PE’s eliminated in a r-configuration; 
none in a c-configuration.
The failure of a RBL (t5) as stated in assumption 6), will have the same 
effect as the failure of CS; therefore A5 = A3 and V5 = V3.
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The failure of a CBL (i6), has the same effect as the failure of a RS; 
therefore Ag —A4 and Fg = F4.
The failure of a SBL (£7), will decrease the number of SBL’s by one and:
A7 = {/(<7),0(f7)} = {{p7 }> {0}}
With a set V7 of variable multiplicities as follows:
' Vi = 1
Transitions and i2 have same set of I/O places and same set of
$
multiplicities; therefore transition ti of the MSPN is defined with A1 = Aj = A2 
and V{ = F4 = F2.
Likewise tz and f5 define transition i2 °f the MSPN with A2 = A3 = A5 
and F2 — F3 — F5.
Transitions f4 and i6 define transition i3 of the MSPN with A3 = A4 = A6 
and F3 = F4 = F6.
Finally transition i7 define i4 with A4 = A7 and F4 = V7.
The set of transitions t thus obtained with the corresponding sets of I/O 
places and variable multiplicities describe the MSPN of the ARCE scheme shown 
in Figure 3.2.
The transition vectors associated with the transitions t are the following:
Bx = [1 1 0 0 0 0 0]
B2 = [0010 100]
Bz = [000 1 0 1 0]
£4 = [000000 1]
Notice that in ARCE, t7 will not occur if = a2 = 0, t2 will not occur if 
a3 == a5 = 0, t3 will not occur if pr4 — o;6 = 0 and t± will not occur if a7 = 0.
3.3.2. Probability Transition Vectors in ARCE
In ARCE, a successful reconfiguration takes place if 1) In a r-configuration 
(r=c), all r RBL’s in the row to be deleted are fault free and 2) in a c- 
configuration (r<c), all r CBL’s, in the column to be deleted are fault free.
In either case we are interested in the distribution of Nx faulty spare RBL’s 
and N2 faulty spare CBL’s, such that N = Nt + N2 is the total number of faulty 
spare links where 0 <ATX <rc, 0 <N2 < rc. In a marking q, the number N of 
faulty SBL’s is obtained as follows:
N = 2 mlq—m7q
where mlq = rc and 0 <N< 2rc. The number of SBL’s that must be fault free 
for a successful reconfiguration is always r. Let H(N) be the number of partitions 
of Ninto parts ATX and N2 such that 0<NuN2<rc, then
_fiV+l N<rc
II{N) — |2rc_(jv—1) N>rc
Assuming all possible partitions of N are equally likely, the probability that any 
nth partition will occur is pr(n) = l/H(N).
Let X be a random variable which denotes the number of faulty sbl s 
(column spares in case of a r-configuration and row spares bypass links in case of 
c-configuration). Then Pr{X=i \ h) is the probability that there are i faulty 
spare links in the row or column to be deleted given the nth partition occurs; this 
probability is given by equation (3.9).
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The total probability Pr(X=»), which corresponds to the probability that * spare 
row/column links are faulty in the row/column to be deleted out of a total of N 
faulty spare links is given by:
H(N) , i H(N) ,










Since 0<? <r, expression (3.10) implies that there will be at most r+1
transitions from a given state to up to r+1 different new states. Each transition
r
is weighted by Pr(X—i) such that Pr(X=i) = 1. Every term in this
x=0
summation corresponds to a transition probability as stated previously. The size 
of the set R of states directly reachable from any given state is for this case up to 
r+1 and includes the failure state if X=r.
Because every possible value of X, may trigger a different reconfiguration the 
following cases are observed:
1) Case of transition t^.- If t=0, a row or column is deleted in a c or r- 
configuration respectively. However if *X), i sequences of rc-deletions are 
required: in a r-COnfiguration i faulty spare row bypass links become faulty active 
row bypass links so £2 is applied i times; In a c-configuration i faulty spare 
column bypass links become faulty active column bypass links so £3 is applied i 
times.
2) Case of transition t2- The application of t2 implies rc-deletions in a r- 
configuration for all i. In a c-configuration however, if *=0, only the column 
affected is deleted; if i>0, then i rc-deletions occur and since the column spare 
bypass links in the columns deleted become active column bypass links then £3 is
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applied i times.
3) Case of transition t3- In this case, t rc-deletions are required in a c- 
rnnfiguration. However in a r-configuration, if i=0, only the affected row is 
deleted, otherwise i rc-deletions are necessary and since the faulty spare row 
bypass links become active row bypass links, 12 is applied i times.
In summary, to capture these cases in an MSPN representation the sequences 
Si, $2 &nd S3 are defined as follows:
_ ((<2, * * * » *2)' if d = 0 
Si — S2 S3 • • • , t3) otherwise
i.e., whenever t2 or t3 fire exponentially, a sequence of r immediate firings of 
t2 or t3 will follow depending whether the current marking corresponds to a r- 
configuration or a c-configuration.
Finally, we adopt the following criteria to determine the number of faulty 
spares that are passed on to the new configuration. When a single row or column 
is eliminated, the number of faulty spares passed on to the new configuration is 
given by:
Ni = N0 - r
In general after k firings of a sequence 5,- have occurred, the following recursion 
can be applied:
Nk = - m
where
r for ti




These expressions assure that the spares that become active and make the 
new configuration possible must be fault-free. The number of faults in a current 
configuration are distributed in the array between the rows and columns deleted 
and the new configuration. Therefore the new configuration will contain non- 
faulty spares if Nk < 0 otherwise iV* faulty spares are passed on to the new 
configuration. To represent this condition every time t% or fires, let a flag y 
be set or reset as follows:
1 if Nk <0
y = i
0 otherwiseV
then the desired number of SBL’s (m7y) in a new marking j is obtained by
modifying the input multiplicities associated with SBL’s as follows:
/U7 = ((2m — Nk-i)y — m(l—y))x+m7(l—x)
3.4. Direct Reconfiguration Scheme
In this section an specific case of reconfigurable processor arrays that follow a 
systematic chained replacement of faulty cells [SaS86a,SaS86b] is analyzed. Figure 
3.3 shows a schematic layout of the hardware requirements for the Direct 
Reconfiguration in an nXn array where interconnections are implemented through 
multiplexers. For illustration, the Direct Reconfiguration (DR) algorithm is 
emphasized, since other schemes within this class (fixed fault-stealing, variable 
fault-stealing, complex fault-stealing, etc.,) [SaS86a,SaS86b] can be analyzed in a 
similar way.
Upon the application of the reconfiguration algorithm (which considers the 
total number of non-faulty cells), a faulty cell is replaced by a spare cell by 
simply reindexing non-faulty cells and bypassing the faulty one. Thus, a shift of
functional cells or chained replacement is carried out when a faulty cell is 
detected. For the case of a single spare row and a single spare column, the 
reconfiguration algorithm scans each column of the array upwards and marks the 
first faulty cell as a vertical fault. All other faults are classified as horizontal 
faults. If one row has more than one horizontal faulty, reconfiguration is not 
possible along that row and the reconfiguration fails.
To analyze the DR scheme, the following components are considered: active 
cells (PE’s); I/O links (IOL’s); for each cell there are two Input Multiplexers 
(IMX’s); for each cell there is one Output Multiplexer (OMX); Bypass Links (BL’s) 
are active links which are used to bypass faulty cells; the Interconnection Links 
(IL’s) are sets of links that define the interconnection network and it is assumed 
(to simplify the analysis) that there is one set per column and that the
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corresponding failure statistics can be provided; spare cells (SPE’s); Spare IOL’s 
(SIOL’s); Spare Multiplexers (SMX’s) which are the non-active multiplexers 
associated with spare cells; Spare Bypass Links (SBL’s) are non-active bypass 
links. ■
In the analysis of this scheme the following assumptions are made:
1) The reconfiguration algorithm is applied to replace either spare or nominal 
faulty cells. In this analysis only one spare row and one spare column are 
assumed.
2) A cell is bypassed by any one of the spare bypass links shown in the diagram 
depending weather the reconfiguration is vertical or horizontal [SaS86a]. 
Since the functions of the bypassed cell are replaced by another cell, a link in 
the IL is activated acting as a bypass. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
always two bypass links will be used to bypass a faulty cell. Also, for a 
successful reconfiguration both spare bypass links must be fault-free.
3) The failure of an IL or an OMX or a BL is fatal.
5) The failure of an SMX or an SIOL disables the spare cell to which they are 
attached.
4) The failure of an IMX or an IOL disables the cell to which they are attached.
3.4.1. MSPN of the DR Scheme
The following set of equations shows the initial configuration of an nXn 
array that supports the DR scheme with one spare row and one spare column. A 
place assigned to each component type is also indicated:
Pl: #PE = n2 . .
Figure 3.3.- Schematic Layout of the DR Structure
p2: ftlOL — 4n2 
p3:#IMX = 2n2 
p4: #OMr =:n2 '
Ps:#BL—2n 
p6: #IL = ra+1 
p7: #SPE = 2n+l 
p8: #SIOL — 4 *(2rc+l) 
p<,: #5MT — 3(2»-|-l)
Pio1 = 2ra2+2(n+l)
Note that in the initial configuration the number of BL’s is given by those 
active links required to bypass both the spare row and the spare column. The 
number of SMX’s correspond to those multiplexers attached to spare cells; since 
they are not active a single place is assigned to them assuming all have the same
failure rate; when a cell becomes active then its 3 SMX’s are separated into 2 
IMX’s and 1 OMX. The total number of SBL’s is given by those existing in the 
nominal array plus (n+1) in the spare row and (n+1) in the spare column.
To construct the MSPN, let us denote by the failure of an SBL (t10) with 
Ai — A10 = {{pio},0} and Vi = Fj0 which contains only the equation Hio — 1.
Next, according to assumption 5, the failure of SIOL (tg) or the failure of an 
SMX (tg), cause the same effect as the failure of an SPE (t7); therefore these 
three transitions define t2 with A2 = A7 = A8 = Ag — {{p7,Ps,p9,Pio}>{P5}}* 
The set of multiplicities associated with the set I/O arcs is defined as: 
V2 =V7 == F8 = Vg which contain the following equations:
M? =1 •
Ms =4
Mg =3 ... . ■ .
M10 = 1 ...
= 1
By assumption 3, the failure of an IL (t6) or the failure of an OMX (£4) or 
the failure of a BL (£5) will cause the array to fail. These transitions define t3 in 
the MSPN with a set of I/O places A3 = A6 A4 = A5 — {{ pj,p2, • • • >Pio 
}>0} and a set of multiplicities V3 = V& = V4 = V5 — • {{ 
Hi = mu,H2 = mi2i••vMio = m»'io}> 0 } any given ith marking.
Finally by assumption 4 the failure of a PE (t/), the failure of an IOL (t2) 
and the failure of an IMX (t3) have the same effect on a given current 
configuration of the array; therefore transition 14 of the MSPN with a set of I/O 
places A4 = Ax = A2 = A3 = {{p7>P8,P9>Pio>P5}>{P5,Pio}}- The corresponding 




(4 =l;f4 = 4;/4 = 3;/4o = 2;^[ = l;^f = 2;//100 = l;/4o = 2;
The Binary Transition Vectors associated with the transitions obtained are 
the following:
Bx =[0 00000000 1]
B2 = [0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0]
£3 = [0 0011100 0 0]
£4 =[1 1 1 0000000]
When fires because a PE or a IOL or an IMX failed, the the array 
reconfigures with a probability of survival Ps=Pljq or fails with probability 1—Ps. 
To capture the transition to the failure state, fires immediately after 14 fires 
exponentially. Hence S4 = (£3). The remaining transitions do not cause any 
immediate firing; therefore, Sx =S2=S3=0. The MSPN obtained for the DR 
scheme is shown in Figure 3.4.
Notice that tx will not occur if a10 =0, t2 will not occur if 
a7 = as = cxg — 0, t3 will not occur if a4 = a5 = o?6 = 0 and 't4 will not occur if 
&i = a2 = a3 = 0.
3.4.2. Probability Transition Vectors in DR
A successful reconfiguration in the DR scheme depends on the availability of 
spare cells upon the failure of an active cell and the fault-free condition of the 
spare bypass links which bypass the faulty cells. The number of faulty cells Ne 






Figure 3.4.- MSPN of the DR Scheme
Nc = 2nq+q2—nii7 
Ns =2n2+2(n+q)+2nq—mi5—mnQ
where q is the number of spare rows and columns, m,-7 = r]i7, m,-5 = rjis and 
m,io = ??,10 are the number of spare cells, the number of active bypass links 
(BL’s) and the number of spare bypass links (SBL’s) in any ith configuration 
respectively.
A probability of transition Pr is one when ti, t% or ts fire. However when t4 
fires the reconfiguration scheme is triggered and the array reconfigures with a 
probability Ps == Pr\j or fails with probability 1—Ps = Pr^. Let P(s \ Nc) 
denote the conditional probability of success given Ne number of faulty cells and 
let P(s | Ns) denote the conditional probability of success given Ns faulty SBL’s. 
The probability of succeiss is then given by:
Ps=P{s\Nc)P{s\Ns) (3.11)
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Thus, the presence of faulty SBL’s in the array affects the overall successful 
reconfiguration rate. The conditional probabilities of success are derived in the 
next paragraphs.
Estimation of P(s | iVc)
To derive the probability of successful reconfiguration given Ne faulty cells, 
the following recursive expression given in [JaR88] is used. Starting from the 
(<7+l)th row to the (»+?)th row of the array the probability that a fatal failure 




at the (n+g)th row the conditional probability is obtained by:








where Pg{j) is the probability that a first fatal failure occurs in the jth row. 
Denote by Pa(i) the probability that a row has exactly i faulty cells then:
PM =
where 5=(n+^)2 is the total number of cells in the array.
Let Pb{j) den°te the probability that a column has at least q faulty cells in 










Now let Pc(i,j) denote the probability that at least q-\-1 out of i columns 
have q faults or more in the first j—1 rows then:
Pc(hJ) = E 
l=q+1
mmi-PHii)i-i





The probabilities of survival given Nc for several array sizes are shown in 
Figure 3.5. These results compare closely with those obtained using simulation as 
reported in [SaS86a].
Estimation of P(e\N,)
To estimate the probability of success given N, faulty SBL’s, let us assume 
that up to two SBL’s per active cell may be faulty. Denote by p a place where a 
cell may have either none, one or two faulty SBL’s then the number of possible 
faulty places denoted by JVp varies as follows:
N.
2 <NP<P
where /? = mm{N„2(n2-Ne)}. The probability of successful reconfiguration given 
N, is given by:








Nc , N> ,
the numerator of the above expression corresponds to the possible number of 
mappings of both faulty cells and faulty SBL’s in which both types of faults do 
not coincide in a single place. The numerator corresponds to the total possible 
number of mappings (fault distributions) given Np and Ne.
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By the Total Probability Theorem, the conditional probability given N, is 
given by:
P{» I N.) = E P(s | Np)P(Np) (3.14)
N,
N>~ —
Finally, substituting and simplifying in the above expression yields (3.13).
3.5. Comparative Results
In this section expressions are derived to determine the state space of the 
three schemes analyzed. The state space size can be obtained through these 
expressions or through MODELGEN. Also some reliability results are reported 
for several sets of failure rates to compare the effect of detailed modeling with 
respect to an analysis in which only failure of PE’s are considered.
3.5.1. State Space
For the schemes analyzed, Table 3.2 shows the growth of the state space as 
function of the size of the array. In this table all failure rates are assumed greater 
than zero in order to generate in each case, the maximum number of states. The 
maximum; number of states tabulated, can be obtained using for each case closed 
form expressions.
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To derive the number of states for the SRE case, let £(n) denote the 
maximum number of states for an nxn array; then:
sSKB{n) = + 2n)
This expression is derived by observing that n states are generated with non- 
faulty SBL’s; for each state i with non-faulty SBL’s, »(»—»') additional states are 
generated. Hence, the total number of states is obtained by solving the
n—1
summationSSRE{n) = [»(»—i)+l] to yield the above expression.
" : , 1=0
For the ARCE case the number of states S(ti) can be derived by observing 
that (2n—1) states are generated with non-faulty SBL’s. Each of these states 




• V i=o . '
from which the following recursion is derived:
Sarce{1) = 3 ^ARCBi71) — Sn-1 + 4n2 — 2 n + 2
with a closed form solution given by::
^ARCE{n) = + 7fl) + 4] + 3
The number of states in the case of DR, can be obtained by the
following expression:
2qn+q2 '
■ ' . :SDR(n)= Yj [(27i2+2(?n+g2)+l)-i] 
i=0
In this expression the summation is carried out over all states generated with i 
faulty SPE’s. Solving this summation the following closed form results:
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SDR(n) - {2qn+q2+l)[2n2+2(qn+q2)+l-(2qn+q2/2,)
simplifying for 5=1, then
Sj)s{n) — (w "1“1)(47i^-(-2ti -i~5)
Using either MODELGEN or the above equations the number of states 
generated in each case is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. State Space Size for three Reconfiguration Algorithms
n SRE ARCE DR
2 8 17 75
3 21 51 188
4 44 107 385
5 80 199 690
6 132 333 1127
7 203 517 1720
8 296 759 2493
9 414 1067 3470
10 560 1449 4675
3.5.2. Reliability Analysis
To illustrate the applicability of MODELGEN, several sets of failure rates 
(«'«) have been selected and described in Table 3.3. For each failure rate set, the 
Reliability (R), the MTTF and the Reliability Improvement Factors (RIF) have 
been computed for a 4x4 processor array. The results obtained are tabulated in 
Table 3.4 for both the SRE and the ARCE reconfiguration schemes.
In our analysis, we have used the PE failure rate as a reference normalized 
with respect to the time unit such that at = 1 and with a coverage factor of c = .99. 
The computations were carried out using the MGRE (Model Generator and 
Reliability Evaluator) software package described in [Lop89].
The main purpose of the tabulations in Table 3.4, is to show the 
interdependencies of the different components now contained in the model. Notice 
for example in column (e), the sensitivity to switch failures of the array with 
SRE; i.e. columns (d) and (e) show the results obtained under similar failure rate 
values except for switches; a reliability improvement factor (RIF) is calculated in 
each case with respect to the simplex (sx) case, which corresponds to the case of 
the failure of the array when a single processor fails; at t = .1 a RIF of 15.91 in 
column (d) decreases to a RIF of 3.87 in column (e) as the failure rate of the 
switches increases from 0.01 to 0.1. The same effect is less noticeable in the array 
with ARCE; Compared to SRE, ARCE is less sensitive to failures in switches and 
links. The Mean Time to Failure of the array with ARCE improves in each case 
considerably with respect to the array with SRE. In summary column (b) shows 
reliability results obtained considering PE’s failures only; on the other hand, 
columns (c-d) show the effect of detailed modeling obtained under different failure 
rate sets.
Table 3.3.- Failure Rates used for the results shown in Table 3.4.
Array col. _£i_ <*4 <X$ Of7 Explanation
a sx - - . (*i=pe f.rate
b 1 •0 .0 .0 .0 .0 - or2=101 f. rate
c 1 .01 .0 .0 .01 .0 - or3=Switch f.rate
SRE d 1 .01 ,01 .01 .01 .01 - Q'4=b.link f.rate
e 1 .01 .1 .01 .01 .01 ' - Of5=h.link f.rate
f 1 .01 .01 .1 .01 .1 - or6=sp.b.link f.rate
g 1 .01 .01 .0 .01 .0 - -
a sx - • - . - . - - ■ - cvg^c-switch f.rate
b 1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 or4==r.switch f.rate
ARCE c 1 .01 ,0 .0 .01 .01 .0 Q'5=c.b.link f.rated 1 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 Qf6=r.b.link f.rate
e 1 .01 .1 .1 .01 .01 .01 a7=sp.b.l.f.rate
f 1 .01 .01 .01 .1 .1 .1 sx=simplex
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Table 3.4.- Reliability and RIF’s for SRE and ARCE with c = .99 and 
Failure Rates given in Table 3.3.
Array
R/RIF Time a b c a e f
SRE; .1 .201897 .97553 .974196 .949305 .792264 .901154
.2 .040762 .889824 .882997 .832308 .580682 .703244
. R ■- .3 .008230 .74327 .729796 .663918 .3869727 .489128.4 .001662 .578714 .561119 .492554 .239752 .315416
.5 .000335 .428912 .410413 .347755 .141386 .194080
.1 32.62 3.93 15.91 3.86 8.50
.2 8.71 8.20 5.80 2.30 3.44
RIF .3 3.86 3.67 2.98 1.62 2.04
.4 — 2.37 2.27 1.98 1.32 1.51
.5 — 1.75 1.70 1.54 1.17 1.27
MTTF _ _ - .510087 .496435 .447789 .280379 .33785
ARCE .1 .201897 .986691 .986227 .985946 .983185 .985713
.2 .040762 .977126 .976359 .975787 .966740 .974176
R
;3 .008230 .969483 .968212 .966729 .939159 .959977
.4 .001662 .961962 .959513 .955845 .894073 .93758
.5 .000335 .95268 .947997 .940533 .831963 .903652
.1 59.97 57.95 55.75 46.78 47.29
.2 — 41.94 4.58 38.91 28.50 31.78
RIF .3 32.50 31.20 29.31 16.17 21.72
.4 — 26.25 24.66 ^2.27 9.38 14.47
V- .5 — 21.13 19.22 16.61 5.93 9.65
MTTF - • - - 2.07274 1.90644 1.74707 1.02882 1.28279
Some reliability results of a 4X4 array with a DR scheme are shown in Table
3.6. Each column corresponds to a set of failure rates tabulated in Table 3.5. 
Column a considers the reliability of the array when only PE’s (SPE’s) fail. The 
remaining columns consider failures in all components in the model; thus, while in 
column b a single failure rate is assumed for all components except PE’s column c 
shows the effect of an increased failure rate of IL's and column d shows the effect 
of an increased failure rate of multiplexers. The array shows increased sensitiyity 
to failures in multiplexers than to failures in the IL's as shown by the reliability 
and MTTF results shown in columns c and d. Because the DR scheme considers
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components of greater complexity (such as IL's and multiplexers) than those used 
in SRE and ARCE, suitable comparison between the three schemes is given by 
column b in Table 3.4 and column a in Table 3.6 in which only failures of PE’s 
are considered.
Table 3.5.- Failure Rates used for the results shown in Table 3.6
col. aP.E aIOL aIMX aOMX aBL aIL aSPE iySlOL aSMX aSBL
a 1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1 .0 .0 .0
b 1 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 1 .01 .01 .01
c 1 .01 .01 .01 .01 .1 1 .01 .01 .01
d 1 .01 .1 .1 .01 .01 1 .01 .1 .01
Table 3.6.- Reliability Results for DR with c = 0.99 and 
Failure Rates given in Table 3.5
time a b c a
.1 0.971744 0.935879 0.894698 0.795178
.2 0.832624 0.744162 0.680113 0.487772
.3 0.576951 0,461321 0.403064 0.212808
.4 0.326881 0.228668 0.191000 0.070372
.5 0.156860 0.094770 0.075675 0.018868
MTTF 0.346681 0.30104 0.2774 0.207435
Let us consider a simplified model such as the one proposed in [WaF88b] 
where the reliability of the array is expressed as R(t) = Rnr(t)XRr(t). The terms 
Rnr and Rr refer to the reliability of non-redundant and redundant hardware 






Consider the No. of IOL’s, HL’s and Switches as the non-redundant hardware, 
then:
^ _ c-(2n2a2 + (n+n2)as + n(n+l)a5)i
Table 3.7 shows the reliability and MTTF results obtained with a set of 
failure rates as shown in row g in Table 3.3 and with c —.99. The results given by 
the simplified model show an underestimation of the reliability of a 4X4 array 
with the SRE scheme as compared to the results obtained by solving the Markov 
model generated by MODELGEN.









In this chapter the application of MSPN’s to generate Markov models for the 
reliability analysis of processor arrays has been shown. Three examples of 
reconfiguration schemes were thoroughly analyzed using MGRE to generate the 
models and reliability results. The analysis covers various components of the 
array and their failure interdependencies. Comparative results show the state 
space generated in each case. Reliability results derived for SRE and ARCE 
compare these two schemes and their responses to different types of failures. A 
possible MSPN representation of the DR scheme has been derived in which dense 
areas are confined into a block (IL’s) to facilitate the analysis. It is assumed that
failure statistics for these blocks are available.
The use of MSPN’s as a modeling technique implies that the reliability 
estimation of any fault-tolerant processor array requires a complete 
understanding of the fault behavior of the array in the presence of any type of 
faults considered in the model. The influence of faulty components other than 
PE’s in a processor array becomes more important as the ratio of area occupied 
by PE’s decreases. In this case to predict the effect of faults in resources such as 
switches, buses, links, etc., on the reliability of the array, detailed modeling is 
justified. However, a complete characterization of the reconfiguration algorithm 
is clearly needed; i.e., specifications such as resource sharing and type of resources 
used to establish interconnections, etc.; particularly in cases of overlapping 
routing paths where conflicts are more likely to occur.
Another advantage of a detailed modeling of an specific array is the 
possibility of measuring the effect of redundant area increments in the overall 
reliability of the array. The problem here is to be able to evaluate the effect on 
the reliability of increased hardware complexity in terms of area requirements. 
However, a detailed modeling of the array, causes a rapid growth of the state 
space and traditional solution methods of reliability models require the 
summation of large number of terms with different signs which increases the effect 
of round-off errors as the system state space grows. Also, the generation of 
absolute large numbers increases the possibility of machine overflow. 
Fortunately, large state spaces can be solved Using randomization techniques 
[GrM84]. On the other hand, approximation and reduction methods can be 
applied for very large systems to derive lower and upper reliability bounds 
[SmG86] without having to solve the entire model. In the latter case, suitable 
criteria should be established to select those operational states whose
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AND A MODEL REDUCTION TECHNIQUE
4.1. Introduction
A fault-tolerant system can be modeled as a continuous-time discrete state 
Markov process whose state space corresponds to the possible operational 
configurations of the system. To derive reliability estimations at a given time, the 
transient probabilities of the operational states of the Markov process are 
required. Traditional solution methods require the summation of large number of 
terms with different signs. Unfortunately, for large state spaces, the likelihood of 
unreliable results increases as round-off errors are introduced in the solution 
process. To overcome this problem the randomization technique has been used as 
an alternate approach to the transient solutions of queueing systems proposed in 
[Gra77a,Gra77b] and for the reliability calculation of fault tolerant systems 
[Mil83]. In this chapter, implementation algorithms to estimate both reliability 
and MTTF using the randomization technique are discussed. Furthermore, by 
eliminating those states with low mean holding times, a reduced model is 
obtained via equalization and lumping techniques [SmG86]. Once a reduced model 
is obtained, the randomization procedure is applied to derive lower and upper 
reliability bounds. The model reduction process requires an early knowledge of 
the MTTF of the original model; therefore, an implementation algorithm to
67
obtain an exact evaluation of the MTTF is discussed. To optimize storage 
requirements and to speed up calculations these algorithms are based on a single 
vector representation of the transition rate matrix. This evaluation approach is 
applicable for large state space models which are represented by an upper 
triangular transition rate matrix. Applications are illustrated through examples of 
evaluation of models generated by MGRE.
The second section of this chapter introduces a brief background on the 
randomization algorithm. Implementation details and an algorithm for reliability 
estimation are presented in the third section, the fourth section discusses a model 
reduction technique using an exact estimation of the MTTF. Finally some 
applications are reported.
4.2, The Randomization Algorithm
Let {X(t), i>0) be a continuous time homogeneous Markov process on a 
finite state space S = {1,2, • • .* ,s}. The state probability vector at time t is 
denoted by P(t) = [P1(t), P2(0> * * * > ], where P{(t) = P{X(t)=^i}, ieS.
The Markov process X(i) can be characterized by a set of differential 




where P(0) corresponds to the initial probability vector and A is an riXri matrix 
with elements aty which are the transition rates from state i to state j and 
aU = Yjatj
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A useful method [Gra77a,Gra77b] to compute the exponential in equation 
(4.2) called uniformization or randomization is described next. Denote by Q the 
transformation of the matrix A as follows:
+ / (4.3)
where A = max a,-,- ieS.
The resulting matrix Q is a transition probability matrix of a discrete-time 
Markov chain (i.e. with entries 0<g,y<l). Substituting A = —hi + AQ in 
equation (4.2), we have:
P{t) = P{ 0)e~A<eA<<? (4.4)








where $(n) = P(0)Qn is a probability vector of a discrete Markov process with a 
transition matrix Q.
In the probabilistic sense the uniformization algorithm can be interpreted as 
follows [Mil83]: let n = 0,1,2, • * * } be a Markov chain on S with transition 
matrix Q and 0} be a Poisson process with rate A; assume both
processes are independent of'each other. Then the process t>0} is a
Markov process with a transition matrix Q with an initial probability state P (0) 
and therefore identical to X(t). Conditioning over the number of occurrences of 
the Poisson process in [0, i ] and using the law of total probability, we have that 
for a given state i:
/>,(<) = P{X(e)=i} (4.6)
= />{^(<) *= = n}
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Defining $t(n) = -P{Tn == ■*} and $(n) = [^(n), $2(^)7 •••], then equation (4.5) 
results.
4.3. Implementation Details
The implementation of the uniformization procedure calls for the calculation 
of #(n) and P{N(t)—n}. Since Q is a stochastic matrix, converges and <f>(n) can 
be calculated recursively by:
$(0) =P(0)
$(n+l) = $(n)Q (4.7)
The Poisson probability of exactly n events in an interval of length t can be 
computed directly. An advantage of the uniformization procedure is that 
precision errors can be bounded by the user. The infinite series is truncated at 
some point n = m, such that the complementary cumulative value remains below 






Let | 4>(n) | denote the norm of the vector <I>(n). Since f $(n) | <j $(m) [' 





Other advantage of this algorithm is its numerical stability. Calculations 
involve only nonnegative numbers.
In [GrM84] an implementation algorithm of (4.7) for sparse matrices is 
presented. Sparse matrices are transformed to a vector representation to minimize 
storage requirements and speed up calculations.
The matrix representations of the models generated via an MSPN 
representation of fault-tolerant processor arrays, exhibit the following features: 
they are large, sparse and upper triangular. Therefore a vector representation is 
simplified and an algorithm similar to that of [GrM84] has been implemented to 





. . MTTF . .
:: *=0
The summation to derive <J,- is truncated when e is reached.
4.3.1. Reliability Estimation Procedure
An algorithm to derive state probabilities for several time points is outlined 
below. The following parameters and notation are used; it — initial time; h — 
length of interval; ni = Number of intervals; E[j] stores the cumulative Poisson 
probability value ^[y] at a time t derived in terms of the index j; ]P {j} stores the 
state probabilities at a time t which it is derived in terms of the index f,
Procedure STATEJPROBS
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Inputs: it, h, ni
Outputs: Vectors P[j]; j=0,l, ..., ni 
Begin
n=0;
calculate $(0) and j $(0) j 
for j=0,l,2 ... ni, do 
E [j]. = bj 
P[j] =0;
end 
ok = 1 
while ok do 
ok = 0




p[j] =p[j] + $(n)x£[y]











The norm of vector P[j] gives the reliability estimation at time t. Notice 
that the vector $(n) which is common for all intervals, is calculated only once. 
The algorithm stops when all intervals have reached the stopping rule contained 
in the if statement.
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4.4. Model Simplification
Given the Markov model, an exact derivation of the MTTF is possible which 
can give us an ’apriori’ knowledge of the stochastic behavior of the Markov chain 
with respect to different failure rates. This suggests a possible state space 
reduction based on the contribution of each state to the overall MTTF. The 
randomization algorithm can then be applied based on a reduced transition rate 
matrix. Leakage equalization techniques as presented in [SmG86] refer to the 
procedure by which all transitions to the failure state from all or a set of 
operational states, are modified to have a single value. The resulting model can be 
reduced by lumping those states with the same leakage value into a single state 
with a single transition to the failure state. Thus, equalization of transitions out 
of those states which exhibit very low mean holding times followed by a lumping 
procedure, reduces the state space of the model to yield a model whose solution 
accuracy depends on the number of states eliminated and the transition rates 
involved. To assess the accuracy of the solution, lower and upper bounds are 
estimated and MTTF results are compared with those of the original model.
4.4.1. MTTF Exact Derivation and Implementation Procedure
To compute the MTTF, we observe that the Laplace transform of equation 
(4.1) can be expressed as follows
AT p — — P{s)
The entries of the vector p correspond to the mean holding time of each state. 
Evaluating at s =0 and using the fact that A is an upper triangular matrix each 
entry of p can be obtained recursively as follows:
Pj = —TtPiaij (4.9)
a) ivy
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Hence, each py is calculated by observing each column of A. The MTTF is then 
calculated as follows:
MTTF = Y^Pj (4.10)
y-o .
Let u be a vector whose entries correspond to the non-zero entries of the 
transition matrix A. Define r,={s,- *,} as a tuple associated with the ith row 
(state) of A where s,- is an integer that indicates the number of transitions 
(targets) from state i; i,- is a set of indices corresponding to the targets of state i. 
An implementation algorithm to calculate the MTTF is outlined below.
Procedure MTTF




for each row i, do 
'/>[*] =0
k^k + si + l
end
■ V p[0] - p[0] . -
k = 0
for each row i, do
for(j—0; j<s,-; j++) do
PfeUU =p[*;[i]] +p[^[i]]Xp[*]X«[A:+i+l]
: - end ’




The complexity of this algorithm is 0(«2) where n corresponds to the 
number of operational states of the Markov model represented by A. The first 
loop initializes the vectors p and p. This initialization is needed to evaluate each 
element of p in the main loop as the rows of A are being fetched from the buffer 
ii. An advantage of this implementation results in the case of very large models 
in which on-line memory is restricted. In this case, the rows of A and all TV’s can 
be fetched directly from a file.
4.4.2. Model Reduction Process
A state *' is a highly probable state if p[ij>f, where f is a user-given constant. 
The model reduction process consists of lumping consecutive states that are non- 
highly probable. The remaining states are systematically reindexed defining a new 
reduced model. This method is well suited for large models that include failures of 
spare components or other components with low failure rates. The failure of a 
single spare component gives place to a new operational state in the Markov 
model; large blocks of states can be generated with low transition rates due to the 
failure of spare components; however other transitions to some of these states 
may or may not turn them into a highly probable states; thus, eliminating states 
based solely on the transition rates does not guarantee satisfactory results. By 
this approach, the elimination of non-highly probable states is controlled by the 
user via the selection of f, and the desired reliability bounds.
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4.4.3. Estimation of Reliability Bounds
It has been shown in [3mG86], that equalizing transitions to the failure state 
{leakage) from.-.states in the entire model or a subset, results in a new model with 
.conservative or optimistic reliability estimations depending whether the 
equalization 's performed with the maximum or the minimum transition to the 
failure state.
Let L be a subset of non-highly probable states; notice that there may be 
several subsets or blocks of consecutive states with a p[i}<$ (leL). For a lower 
bound a state A: is selected such that its leakage corresponds to the maximum 
leakage:
^max = max,£i I I
Likewise for an upper bound, a state keL is selected such that its leakage 
corresponds to the minimum leakage:
^min = mintej^ j YjO'ij I
3 ■ ■
The resulting model has a set L of states with the same leakage. All other 
transitions to states out of L are eliminated. Thus, the set L can be lumped into 
a single state keL with no change in the reliability estimation. The process is 
repeated for each subset L that can be formed in the original model. The resulting 
model is a reduced model with a reliability corresponding to a lower/upper bound 
with respect to the original model.
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4.5. Applications
In this section the reliability plots for 4X4 and 10X10 AR.CE arrays are 
shown to illustrate the lower and upper reliability bounds that result upon the 
selection of the constant £. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the case of a 4X4 array; 
Figure 4.1 corresponds to the case of f=.01 where the lower bound reliability 
curve is shown with a MTTF =.911763 and the upper bound reliability curve with 
a MTTF=2.95693; the exact reliability is also shown with a MTTF =1.28279. 
Figure 4.2 shows the case of f=.005; in this case the lower bound and upper 
bound reliability curves are closer to the exact reliability curve with 
MTTF=1.1854 for the lower bound and MTTF—1.72181 for the upper bound. 
While the original model contains 107 states, reduced models with f=.01 and 
$■=.005 are obtained with 19 and 21 states respectively.
exact rel.(mttf= 1.28279) 
ub. rel.(mttf=2.95693) 
lb. rel.(mttf= .911763)
Fig. 4.1. ARCE 4X4 Exact Reliability (107 states) and 
Lower and Upper Bounds (19 slates) with $ = .01
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exact rel,(mttf= 1.28279) 
ub. rel.(mttf—1.72181) 
lb. rel.(mttf=1.1854)
Figure 4.2. ARCE 4X4 Exact Reliability (107 states) and 
Lower and Upper Bounds (21 states) with £=.005
A 10X10 ARCE array will be represented by a more complex model with
1449 states with a MITF =1.53484. The plots in Figures 4.3-4.5 show the 
reliability approximations obtained upon the selection of three different constants 
£. Figure 4.3 shows the results obtained with £=.001 with a MTTF=1.23601 for 
the lower bound curve compared to a MTTF=1.67142 for the upper bound curve; 
these results correspond to a reduced model with 44 states. Figure 4.4 shows the 
results obtained with £=.0005 with a MTTF=1.28975 for the lower bound curve 
compared to a MTTF=1.55848 for the upper bound curve; the reduced model in 
this case contains 47 states. In Figure 4.5 £=.0001 with a MTTF=1.52796 for the 
lower bound curve compared to a MTTF=1.54118 for the upper bound curve; 
these results correspond to a reduced model with 47 states; As the lower and 
upper MTTF values come closer to the exact MTTF, the reliability curves 
coincide giving an indication of the real reliability values without having to solve
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the entire model.
......... ub. rel.(mttf= 1.67142)
------- lb. rel.(mttf= 1.23601)
exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)
Fig. 4.3. ARCE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (44 states)
with £ = .001
4.6. Summary
In summary, the general randomization procedure can be used to estimate 
the reliability of very large models. Using an early estimation of the MTTF of the 
entire model, fast reliability results can be obtained via the solution of a reduced 
model. By comparing the mean holding time of each state in the original model, 
every subset of consecutive states is lumped into a single state. The set of states 
created by this process is then aggregated with the remaining states to form a 
new reduced model. A systematic reindexing is carried out and the 
randomization procedure is applied to Obtain lower and upper reliability bounds.
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....... . ub. rel.(mttf= 1.55848)
------- lb. rel.(mttf= 1.28975)
exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)
Fig. 4.4. ARCE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (47
with <r = .0005
Thus, the model reduction process is straightforward and transparent to the user. 
The solution of the new model corresponds to a lower bound if the state 
replacement is based on the maximum leakage to the failure state; a minimum 
leakage replacement yields an upper bound solution. To illustrate the 
applicability of this method, solutions of small and large models were shown.
One contribution of the work outlined in this chapter consists of the 
implementation of an algorithm to evaluate reliability models. An additional 
contribution consists of the possibility of obtaining approximate reliability 
estimations of large processor arrays; i.e., using reduced models, lower and upper 
bounds can be obtained. However, a drawback in the reduction process is the 
fact that a matrix representation is required for an early estimation of the MTTF. 
Thus the need to reduce storage requirements through a vector-like representation 
is justified. However it seems reasonable to further explore (in future research) 
features such as upper triangularity and sparseness of the transition matrix to
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......... ub. rel.(mttf= 1.54118)
lb. rel.(mttf= 1.52796) 
exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)
Fig. 4.5. AR.CE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (57 states)
with f = .0001
calculate the MTTF and select the desired states during the construction of the 
reachability graph without the need to store the entire model. At this point the 




In this chapter, 2-level hierarchical structures are analyzed. The components 
of the hierarchy are fault-tolerant processor arrays that support any of the 
folio-wing reconfiguration algorithms: DR, RR and RCR. DR refers to the direct 
reconfiguration scheme; the RR (Row Replacement) scheme is a variation of the 
SRE Scheme such that the size of the array remains constant throughout its 
operational life and can tolerate only a number of faulty processing elements 
corresponding to the number of spare rows. The RCR (Row or Column 
Replacement) scheme is a variation of the ARCE scheme such that the size of the 
array remains constant throughout its operational life and it has a given number 
of spare rows and spare columns; the number of faults tolerated corresponds to 
the number of spare rows and columns. The choice of non-degradable processor 
arrays allows the analysis of several hierarchical schemes by using a given 
reconfiguration scheme in any place in the hierarchy. Although several measures 
can be used to compare several schemes, the use of the MTTF permits the 
comparison of a large number of schemes and helps in determining the effects of 
detailed modeling in a particular hierarchical scheme; for this purpose, the results 
obtained are grouped in two tables. One table describes a set of MTTF’s obtained 
when only PE’s fail. A second table describes results obtained when faults of
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several component types are considered. To observe a more detailed behavior in 
their reliability some hierarchical schemes are selected from the MTTF tables.
5.2. Taxonomy of Hierarchical Schemes
Let H = <S,K> denote a given hierarchical scheme where S refers to a set 
whose elements identify the reconfiguration algorithms used at different levels in 
the hierarchy. The subarray size at each level is specified by K as follows:
K — (ft1, ft2 j • • • > ftfcj





where n corresponds to the size of a single level processor array. Thus, in a given 
hierarchical structure, a subarray at the tth level is of size n,- and it is formed 
with subarrays of size ; the subarray at the fth level is implemented using the 
reconfiguration scheme in the fth position of the set S. For example, if ft =16, one 
possible representation of a 3-level structure implemented with only an x 
reconfiguration scheme is:
<(a;, z,x), (2,2,4 j>
which indicates that at each level the array supports the reconfiguration scheme x 
and that in the first level the size of the subarray is 2, in the second level the size 
is also 2 and in the third level the array is composed of 4 subarrays,
Note that if there are m different reconfiguration schemes and each can fit at 
any level in the hierarchical array, then with respect to S there are mk possible 
hierarchical configurations. Thus, the selection of an optimal configuration must
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correspond to an optimal value of a measure of interest such as MTTF, Mission 
Time, Performability, etc. An analytical determination of an optimal hierarchical 
configurations is addressed in [WaF88b].
To estimate the reliability and MTTF of a k-level hierarchical array, the 
following criteria are used:
1) The failure rate of a processing unit (subarray) at the ith level is estimated 




where y denotes the name of the reconfiguration scheme used in the (i-l)th 
level.
2) The failure rate of component types other than processing units at the jth 
level is assumed to be proportional to the failure rate of the corresponding 
component type at the (i-l)th level such that:
<*i,i = (5*2)
the subindex i refers to the component type i at the jth and (j-l)th levels; as 
defined above, the term ny_i corresponds to the size of the subarray at the 
(j-l)th level. Hence, using this criteria the complexity of a component type is 
assumed to increase linearly with respect to the same component type in a 
single level array. Also, the increasing complexity of interconnections as the 
level of the hierarchy increases is taken into account.
5.3. Fault-Tolerant 2-level Hierarchical Arrays
The use of three different reconfiguration schemes gives a total of 32 = 9 
possible choices for a 2-level hierarchical Scheme. The schemes used are the DR 
scheme which was analyzed previously, the RR scheme and the RCR scheme. The
RR and the RCR schemes are a variation of the SRE and ARCE schemes 
respectively, in the sense that the size of the array remains constant throughout 
its operational life. Both schemes will tolerate a number of faulty PE’s equal to 
the number of spare rows and columns provided. Since the DR scheme analyzed 
in chapter 2 considers only one spare row and one spare column, for compatibility 
two spare rows are considered in the RR scheme and one spare row and one spare 
column in the RCR scheme.
All results in each table assume a coverage factor c — .99; each PE in the 
first level and in single-level arrays is assumed to fail at a rate otpg = .01; each 
component of every other type is assumed to fail at a rate 100 times less than 
that of a single PE.
The MTTF’s obtained for single-level arrays are shown in Table 5.1, for several 
array sizes. For each reconfiguration scheme, these results show the effect of the 
size of the array on the MTTF when only PE’s fail and with detailed modeling. 
High MTTF’s of the DR scheme with respect to RR and RCR, reflect the fact 
that a failure in the DR leads to a single PE substitution; in the RR scheme a 
single PE failure leads to the substitution of a complete row; in the RCR, a single 
PE failure causes a row or a column substitution. Notice that the RCR case 
contains one extra spare processing unit with respect to RR, however, this has the 
tendency to decrease the MTTF because while in the RR case the failure of any 
spare unit implies the elimination of n units, in the RCR case however, n-j-1 units 
are eliminated. Another conclusion that can be drawn from Table 5.1 is the fact 
that the MTTF of nXn processor arrays with a fixed structure decreases as the 
size n of the array increases.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the results for every possible set 5; for n = 64, each 
entry displays the MTTF corresponding to a particular set K. Table 5.2
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tabulates the MTTF’s obtained when only PE’s fail and Table 5.3 considers 
detailed modeling in which other component types in the array can fail. For 
simplification SBL’s in every scheme are assumed fault-free. However SBL’s that 
become active can fail and their complexity increases in the second level according 
to the size of the subarray in the first level. An immediate advantage of a 2-level 
hierarchical structure can be seen by comparing the MTTF of a single-level 64 X 
64 processor array with any reconfiguration scheme (last row in Table 5.1) with 
any entry in Tables 5.2 and 5.3; he., except for some cases (single level 64X64 DR 
array), most 2-level choices yield and improvement in its MTTF with respect to 
the single-level structure. Hierarchical arrays implemented with the DR scheme 
in at least one level show an improvement in their MTTF with respect to those 
arrays implemented with RR and/or RCR. Examine, for example, the row 
corresponding to RR implemented with DR; it is interesting to note the MTTF 
improvement with the size of the processing units implemented with DR. Two 
factors influence this effect: 1) the loss in MTTF due to the size increments of the 
subarray (with DR) are compensated with the gain in MTTF with a lower 
dimension of the array in the second level implemented with RR; 2) the 
probability of survival of arrays with DR increases with the size of the array 
[SaS86a]. This factors also explain the case of (dr,dr) which shows the best MTTF 
of all the possibilities.
To observe the reliability behavior of hierarchical arrays with DR the 
following cases are plotted in the figures indicated.
In Figure 5.1 the reliabilities of the schemes ((dr,rr), (4,16)), ((dr,rr), (8,8)) and 
((dr,rr), (16,4)) are compared. In this set, the second level is implemented with 
RR with subarrays implemented with DR. The best structure on this set consists 
on 4X4 arrays with RCR with 16X16 DR subarrays.
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Figure 5.2 plots the reliabilities of the set: ((dr,rcr), (4,16)), ((dr,rcr), (8,8)) and 
((dr,rcr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.3 plots: ((rr,dr), (4,16)), ((rr,dr), (8,8)) and ((rr,dr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.4 plots: ((rcr,dr), (4,16)), ((rcr,dr), (8,8)) and ((rcr,dr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.5 plots the set ((dr,dr), (4,16)), ((dr,dr), (8,8)) and ((dr,dr), (16,4)) which 
correspond to the most reliable structures for the set of failure rates specified 
previously.
Table 5.1.-MTTF’s for Single-level Fault-tolerant Processor Arrays
n rr




1 182.35 174.126 157.668 166.083 155.786 138.393
2 53.7925 52.4267 92.2377 49.9527 48.0654 81.1081
4 15.292 15.1283 34.6681 14.3604 14.0419 30.7144
8 4.164 4.14886 12.1023 3.93578 3.8755 10.7263
16 1.0951 1.09393 4.24583 1.03883 1.02526 3.72798
32 .28152 .281434 1.49453 .267567 .26422 : 1.28742
64 .071419 .071413 .525113 .067945 .0671025 .438697
Table 5.2.- MTTF Results for Several 2-level Hierarchical Arrays with »=64
where only Processing Units fail.
Reconf.
Schemes (1,64) (2,32) (4,16) (8,8) (16,4) (32,2) (64,1)
(rr,rr) .13022 .15144 .16746 .17339 16746 • . .15144 .13022
(rcr,rr) .12436 .14759 .16567 .172758 .167284 .15139 .13021
(dr,rr) .112604 .259664 .379654 .50394 .649272 .803946 .957464
(rr,dr) .957468 .803936 .649272 .503938 .379653 .259664 .112604
(rcr,dr) .914358 .783526 .642312 .502108 .379248 ■.259588, -.412596'
(dr, dr) .827933 1.37851 1.47195 1.46466 1.47195 1.12418 .827932
(rr,rcr) .130211 .15139 .167284 .172758 .165671 .14759 .12436
(rcr,rcr) .12435 .147546 .165493 .17213 .165493 .147546 .12436
(dr,rcr) .112596 .259588 .379246 .502108 .64323 .783532 .914359
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Table 5.3.- MTTF Results for Several 2-level Hierarchical Arrays with n-64
with Detailed Modeling.
Reconf.
Schemes 11,64) 12,32) 14,16) (8,8) 116,4) (32,2) (64,1)
(rr,rr) .109331 .13363 .152519 .160952 .157168 .142994 .123372
(rcr,rr) .103054 .128854 .149238 .158533 .15561 .141214 .121843
(dr,rr) .09231 .210512 .31536 .425479 .548872 ,671337 .778616
(rr,dr) .640056 .64319 ,564834 .457919 .352638 .243947 .106487
(rcr,dr) .634358 .622186 .553217 .451176 .348128 .240927 .105211
(dr,dr) .570113 .959717 1.11363 1.16951 1.20048 1.12418 .665665
(rr,rcr) .10717 .131991 .151273 .159744 .155163 .174985 ,117712
(rcr,rcr) .110113 .127298 .148039 .157351 .153161 .137465 .116255
(dr,rcr) .0907614 .206441 .310446 .419627 .539103 .650625 .739422
R(t)
0.8-
0 1 2 3 4




Fig. 5.2.- Reliability plots for (dr,rcr) Arrays
5.4. Summary
In this chapter, possible implementations of hierarchical arrays were 
analyzed and compared in terms of their MTTF. A brief taxonomy was 
introduced to relate the reconfiguration algorithms and sizes of the arrays at each 
level in the hierarchy. For compatibility this analysis was carried out using fixed- 
structure arrays capable of supporting reconfiguration algorithms such as the DR, 
RR and RCR. The last two being a variation of the SRE and ARCE 
reconfiguration algorithms analyzed previously using MSPN’s. '
Results were derived for cases in which only the processing unit fails and 
when other component types fail also. The failure rate of a subarray used as a 
processing unit in the immediately higher level was derived in terms of its MTTF. 





Fig. 5.3.- Reliability plots for (rr,dr) Arrays
size of the processing units and the failure rates used in the immediately lower 
level. At the first level, the failure rates are chosen by the user. The results shown 
correspond to a failure rate of a processing element in the first level of .01 
failures per time unit; detailed modeling assumes failure rates for any other 
component type of .0001 failures per unit time. For the cases analyzed, the 
MTTF decreases as the size of the array increases. However any combination for a 
hierarchical implementation renders an improvement in its MTTF with respect to 
a single-level implementation with the same number of PE’s. Comparing all the 
possible hierarchical implementations the ones with DR as a component in the 
hierarchy render better results; particularly, for the failure rates chosen, the 




In this report, a systematic method to construct Markov models to analyze 
fault-tolerant processor arrays was presented. Since the proposed method rests on 
the premise that a fault-tolerant processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic 
Petri Net, a modified version of Stochastic Petri Nets referred to as MSPN’s is 
proposed to model the fault behavior of processor arrays in the presence of 
failures of components of different types. An MSPN model contains all the 
information pertaining to the processor array structure and a specific 
reconfiguration scheme such that the derivation of a detailed Markov model is 
straightforward. Attributes associated with the transitions in an MSPN model 
include a probability distribution generated in terms of the number of faulty 
components in each operational marking. This probability distribution includes 
probabilities of reconfiguration which together with other attributes, establish a 
mapping from transitions in the MSPN to transition rates in the corresponding 
Markov model. Specific reconfiguration algorithms such as SRE, ARCE and DR 
were analyzed. Reliability results for these three schemes were derived. The 
analysis covers several components of the array and their failure 
interdependencies. Analytic expressions to evaluate probabilities of 
reconfiguration for each scheme were derived. These expressions involve complex 
combinatorial analysis and for some reconfiguration schemes, simulation has been 
used to obtain probabilities of reconfiguration. For the DR case, the results
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obtained via the analytical expressions derived, match those reported in the 
literature.
A software package, MGRE (Model Generator and Reliability Evaluator) 
which generates the Markov models and evaluates reliability, has been developed 
[Lop89]. However, the user is expected to provide files with the probabilities of 
reconfiguration. Since access to those files may be tailored according to particular 
applications, the user is also expected to provide subroutines to access the 
required values. Also, for complex reconfiguration schemes in which sequences of 
transitions that fire immediately cannot be predetermined for all markings, the 
user is required to provide subroutines that examine each marking in order to 
determine the type of reconfiguration or any other parameter used in the selection 
of a sequence. An extensive use of MGRE for different reconfiguration schemes 
can lead to a better design of a user interface.
The intrinsic large models generated for even moderate array sizes, cannot be 
easily solved using existing reliability evaluation packages due to numeric round­
off errors introduced during the evaluation process. Also, the large numbers 
involved in the solution process of large models may cause machine overflow. The 
Solution proposed in this work is based on the general randomization procedure. 
An algorithm was implemented using this procedure such that the solution of 
fairly large models is possible. Furthermore, it is shown that given an early 
estimation of the MTTF of the entire model, fast reliability results can be 
obtained via the solution of reduced models.
Hierarchical arrays were also discussed as an application of MGRE. Several 
2-level structures were compared using as processing units subarrays of different 
dimensions and with different reconfiguration schemes. For compatibility, this 
analysis includes processor arrays with a fixed-size structure; i.e., no performance
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degradation allowed. It was shown that hierarchical structures offer a good 
potential to increase reliability with respect to single-level arrays with the same 
number of processing elements.
The main contribution of this research consists of a procedure to analyze 
fault-tolerant processor arrays using a more general approach and with an 
optional modeling detail. Given the MSPN of a particular reconfiguration scheme, 
Markov models of an array of any size can be derived for selected sets of failure 
rates. Thus, several array architectures can be compared in terms of their 
reliability and MTTF.
Detailed modeling preserves all the information of the structure of the array 
in each operational state. Therefore, performability and other performance and 
area related measures can be derived in terms of each operational state. 
Furthermore, the approach presented in this thesis can be applied to analyze 
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